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Labor Supply and Consumption Smoothing 
When Income Shocks Are Non-Insurable 
 
The paper investigates how employees use secondary employment to smooth out 
consumption shortfalls from non-anticipated wage shocks in their main employment. The 
identification strategy exploits surprising changes in firms’ wage payment and repayment 
behavior in Ukraine. Based on unique nationally representative panel data, the econometric 
approach accounts for workers’ unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error in the 
wage shock information. The estimated labor supply responses suggest that secondary 
activities are used as temporary coping strategies against wage shocks and that they closely 
follow the lifecycle of wage arrears. Households that engage in secondary employment can 
successfully smooth their consumption. The results are robust to several alternative 
hypotheses concerning the observed labor supply pattern. 
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 1  Introduction 
How do workers respond to non-anticipated transitory wage shocks in their main 
employment in a setting of imperfect markets, credit constraints and missing social security? 
Particularly, do they re-allocate working time between the main job and additional jobs? The 
goal of this research is to understand whether employees and their households are able to 
smooth out consumption against negative wage shocks in the main job by adapting their 
portfolio of activities. This is especially relevant if workers are unable to switch employers at 
low costs, for instance because wage non-payment exerts a bonding effect towards the current 
employer or because wage shocks are regionally concentrated. 
The underlying theoretical framework of the paper is given by a simple dual job 
holding model with random wage shocks in the main job, so that additional jobs can be taken 
up in order to smooth out consumption shortfalls. The empirical analysis includes cross-
sectional and panel estimations based on a unique nationally representative data set from 
Ukraine for the early 2000s. This case study setting is interesting as shortfalls in wage 
payments were quite common (over 10% of the workforce each year) and as unusually rich 
data on wage shocks are available. Coping activities were widely available so that employees 
can either enter a second position as dependently employed worker or use smallholder 
farming activities.  
The paper addresses several potential empirical problems in the estimation of a 
multiple job holding model. For instance, it deals with omitted variable bias by accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity through fixed effects estimation. The analysis also addresses 
measurement error in the reported wage shocks by applying an instrumental variable (IV) 
method that exploits the fact that firms’ pay practices were regionally highly concentrated.  
The estimated labor supply responses to wage shocks indicate a re-allocation of 
working hours from main to second jobs—with important differences between activities. 
Exogenous variation in firms’ wage repayment is used to show the robustness of the identified 
effects. As workers resemble participants of a lottery and cannot determine the arrival of wage 
repayment, it is possible to test the motivation for holding second jobs and to study the 
consumption smoothing behavior over the entire duration of the wage shock cycle. Further 
support stems from the fact that none of the presented alternative hypotheses can 
convincingly rival the consumption smoothing motive of second job holdings. This also 
implies that there is no evidence for anticipatory behavior in the sense that workers might 
respond to shocks ex-ante. In line with the estimated individual labor supply responses, 
2 households cannot ex-ante insure their consumption against wage shocks but manage to 
smooth out temporary shortfalls with the help of secondary activities.  
The contributions of this paper are the following: This is the first empirical study to 
analyze second jobs as a mode of consumption smoothing in the presence of main job wage 
shocks. Combining three previously unrelated strands of literature on wage shocks, second 
job holdings and consumption smoothing helps to gain new insights into how individuals and 
households manage to cope with income shocks. Different from much of the previous 
literature this paper exploits direct evidence on exogenous wage shocks. This unique variation 
in wage levels allows to explicitly link firms’ wage policies to individual shock responses 
over the entire duration of the earnings loss. Wage shocks have adverse effects on workers at 
the time they occur, but this paper additionally analyzes the effect of the termination of the 
shock—by using unique information on exogenous repayments. The analysis of both onset 
and offset of wage shocks lends substantial robustness to the estimates. Finally, this study 
extends the application of a dual job labor supply model to an emerging country context. The 
research is based on the supposition that individuals are myopic and credit constrained which 
seems quite realistic for many lower and middle income countries.  
There are two main aspects of this research which are of particular policy relevance: 
First, the analysis of wage shocks illustrates how firms’ payment policies affect labor supply. 
Legal institutions that are too weak to enforce wage claims drive individuals into coping 
mechanisms which might potentially imply an inefficient allocation of resources. This is 
especially so when regional clustering of bad payment practices prevents regional labor 
markets from functioning. Second, this paper investigates the question whether unanticipated 
wage shocks can be smoothed out by individuals and households in imperfect capital markets, 
i.e. when wage shocks cannot be insured. The impact of wage shocks is especially immediate 
in a setting where household savings have been depleted and hence cannot be used to buffer 
the shortfall and where the state does not provide any social security minimum.
1 Low 
mobility across jobs, sectors and regions prompts ‘on-the-job-responses’. Thus, the following 
research addresses the ability of households to engage in self-help as well as the subsequent 
welfare implications.
2  
                                                 
1 Suffering from wage arrears does not entitle to the receipt of any state benefits. For the years prior to the 
Russian financial crisis 1998/1999, Guariglia and Kim (2003) found evidence for some precautionary saving 
behaviour in Russia. 
2 As will be briefly discussed in the conclusion, the shift from main to second jobs may also change the role of 
the informal sector, which might be larger for second job holdings (cp. Guariglia and Kim, 2006). 
3 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant 
economic concepts of the labor allocation decision under uncertainty, multiple job holdings 
and consumption smoothing. It also provides background information on the nature of wage 
shocks and coping activities in Ukraine in the 2000s. Section 3 introduces the data sets. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the econometric approach. The results concerning the 
individual labor supply responses to wage shocks and the consumption smoothing abilities of 
households are reported in Section 5. Section 6 discusses potential alternative hypotheses and 
presents the results of several robustness checks. The final section concludes with policy 
implications.  
 
2  Background 
2.1  Theoretical Background 
One of the fundamental questions in labor economics is how individuals adapt their 
labor supply in response to wage or income changes. Research on transitory wage shocks has 
received limited attention for substantial time, as permanent income or consumption insurance 
models pay disproportional attention to permanent shocks. Consequently, the modern inter-
temporal model of labor supply has largely ignored transitory wage shocks because it expects 
them to play only an insignificant role in the life cycle labor supply decision.
3 In recent years, 
however, the interest in wage uncertainty and transitory wage shocks surged as the 
assumptions of the inter-temporal labor supply model seem too restrictive. Mainly, the 
suppositions of perfect foresight and the absence of credit constraints are inadequate for many 
countries, and in particular in countries with incomplete markets and ongoing structural 
change, like most developing and emerging countries. The latter setting prompts the use of the 
myopic consumption model, in which individuals react to transitory shocks as they would 
react to permanent ones (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2006). Beside theoretical reasons in favor of 
the study of transitory wage shocks, a higher econometric sensitivity to distinguish anticipated 
from non-anticipated wage shocks has promoted research on unanticipated transitory wage 
shocks—a field that had been ignored until recently (Pistaferri, 2003). 
Three strands of literature are central to investigating the effect of wage shocks in the 
main job on consumption smoothing through coping activities. In a standard labor supply 
                                                 
3 When the marginal utility of wealth is constant over time. 
4 model with only one job, the effect of wage uncertainty on labor supply is theoretically 
ambiguous. Block and Heineke showed that higher wage uncertainty leads to increased 
working effort if the substitution effect towards leisure is dominated by the income effect in 
the Hicks-Slutsky equation (Block and Heineke, 1973). However, this literature does not 
allow for the possibility of second jobs. Around the same time, multiple job holding models 
emerged with a particular focus on the labor supply behavior of individuals who face working 
hours constraints in the main job. In their model of second job holdings, Shishko and Rostker 
(1976) formally derived cross-wage labor responses and showed that individuals who are 
hours constrained will increase second job labor supply with decreasing main job wage if 
leisure is a normal good. An increase in non-labor income leads unambiguously to a decrease 
in second job holdings through the income effect. Other authors describe alternative motives 
to hold a second job—like the portfolio combination of stable and secure with casual 
prestigious employment—without explicitly addressing the role of consumption smoothing 
(Paxson and Sicherman, 1996; Smith Conway and Kimmel, 1998). The third strand of 
literature focuses on consumption smoothing in general, and on the question how people 
reduce income risk specifically. Different from the truly inter-temporal labor supply model 
which expects transitory wage shocks to have no effect on labor supply, today’s perception is 
that insurance is incomplete, especially for unexpected or low-frequency shocks. For both, 
developing and developed countries, economists have presented evidence that shocks are not 
perfectly insurable and that households engage in specific consumption smoothing activities 
(Cochrane, 1991; Townsend, 1994; Attanasio and Székely, 2004).
4 This paper combines all 
three strands of literature in order to pay attention to the potential consumption smoothing 
motive of secondary jobs, specifically against main job wage shocks. Myopic and credit-
constrained individuals cope with income shortfalls by reallocating effort between main and 
second jobs. The novel aspect of this paper is that it focuses on within-person labor supply 
responses which crucially depend on the availability of outside insurance options (Low, 
Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010). In this respect this paper stands in contrast to the added worker 
                                                 
4 For countries with at least basic social security systems, one can expect that social protection indeed smoothes 
out labor market shocks—and simultaneously at least partly crowds out coping mechanisms (Cullen and Gruber, 
2000). However, even under these conditions, increasing inequality over the life cycle is hard to explain when 
precluding the importance of uninsurable idiosyncratic risks (Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron, 2001).
 
5 literature, which investigates labor supply responses of married women to their husband’s 
unemployment (Lundberg, 1985).
5  
The following analysis is based on a simple static model of labor supply. Individuals 
are assumed to maximize utility U(c, l) which for simplicity only contains two arguments, 
consumption c and leisure l. There are two main reasons for choosing a static model of labor 
supply: First, Ukraine, the country under consideration, is a lower middle income country in 
which individuals are severely credit constrained;
6 thus a life cycle model which assumes 
away credit constraints would be inappropriate. Second, the wage shocks which individuals 
are facing in this setting (and which will be described in greater detail below) are 
unanticipated so that employees can be assumed to behave myopically.  
Employed individuals allocate effort h between two different jobs (subscript 1 
indicating the main job and 2 indicating the optional secondary activities) subject to a total 
time (T) constraint T = h1 + h2 + l  with h1 > 0, h2 ≥ 0, the budget constraint y = w1h1 + w2h2 
+ A, where w indicates the wage rate for main or second job and A is a measure of non-labor 
income, as well as to a non-hiring constraint h1 + h2 ≤ T. In an environment of working hours 
constraints, Sishko and Rostker (1976) have shown that a decrease in the main job wage rate 
lets an individual shift effort towards the second job. It is straightforward to consider a similar 
problem in a setup with a stochastic wage shock γ (as in Kurkalova and Jensen, 2000). 
Kurkalova and Jensen show that the behavioral responses are ∂h2/γ >0 and ∂h1/γ <0. 
 
2.2  Wage Arrears 
Ukraine offers an interesting setting to analyze labor supply responses to wage shocks 
under myopia and credit constraints: The high incidence of wage arrears in the country 
provides an interesting source of exogenous variation in wage payments. But while wage 
arrears were seen as a characteristic feature of post-Soviet labor markets in the mid-1990s, 
they gained prominence in several countries during the recent global financial crisis (ILO, 
2009). Even before, wage arrears had become increasingly problematic in some developing 
and emerging countries, for instance, among migrant workers in China and the Middle East 
(UNDP, 2005) and in many enterprises in India. In industrialized countries, wage arrears are 
                                                 
5 Consequently, one caveat of the analysis concerns the joint labor supply decision within households (Becker, 
1965) which remains beyond the scope of this research. The labor force participation of women in Ukraine is 
quite high so that the scope for more spouses to enter the labor market is limited. 
6 According to the World Bank (2008), access to financial intermediation in Ukraine even lags behind countries 
like Angola, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Libya and Mongolia—to name just a few. 
6 of minor importance on the aggregate level and mostly appear temporarily when firms, e.g. 
start-ups, undergo financially difficult times; however, more structural wage arrears can be 
observed for the close-to-poverty part of the working population. In the UK, for instance, 
wage arrears were problematic as a consequence of enterprises failing to pay at least the legal 
minimum wage, especially before drastic fines and a short pay-back period were introduced in 
2007.
7  
Arrears were initially understood as a consequence of decline in demand during the 
recession or as a result of firms’ illiquidity.
8 However, this perspective was challenged when 
matched employer-employee data from Russia revealed that wage arrears were observable not 
only in poorly-performing but also in many well-performing firms and that worker turnovers 
remained relatively modest despite the substantial losses to individual incomes. From these 
findings, Earle and Sabirianova (2002) developed an institutional theory of wage arrears 
which understood wage non-payment as a function of managerial contract-violating behavior 
and poor contract enforcing institutions.
9 In other words, poor managerial behavior and 
workers’ inability to enforce wage claims through courts led to substantial levels of wage 
non-payment.
10 Wage arrears were found to be sectorally and regionally highly correlated 
with little structure across groups of workers so that the tacit collusion in contract violation 
seriously restricted outside options for workers (Earle and Sabirianova, 2009).
11 Hence, the 
                                                 
 
7 According to HMRC inquiries, 25,000 low-pay employees were affected by wage arrears in the UK in 2006 
(BBC, 2007). 
8 The neoclassical view of this phenomenon regarded wage arrears as a flexible tool to cushion the hardship of 
restructuring overstaffed state enterprises (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999; Desai and Idson, 2000). 
9 The above cited study on China clearly depicts discrimination between home and migrant workers in China as 
main reason for wage arrears. Also in the UK, non-payment of legal minimum wages can be expected to reflect 
managerial behaviour rather than illiquidity of firms. 
10 In most cases, workers did not file lawsuits, as courts were not assertive and their decisions had huge delays 
(cp. Earle, Spicer and Sabirianova, 2004). Court decisions in favor of workers were regularly ignored up until 
mid 2005, when a Ukrainian teacher won her case at the European Court of Human Rights (CFTUU, 2008). The 
Accounting Chamber of Ukraine states that “the systematic failings and infringements [...] identified [in wage 
non-payment] suggest an inadequate level of organization [...] and a lack of control” in many administrative 
bodies of Ukraine (UN CESCR, 2007: 14). 
11 As a legacy from the Soviet Union, the existence of one-factory-towns and regionally concentrated economic 
sectors have clearly contributed to a geographic clustering of these shocks. Earle and Sabirianova (2002) argue 
that poor outside options in local labor markets might set free a self-enforcing spiral of wage arrears, as local 
entrepreneurs find it increasingly attractive to hold back wages. What is less well established is whether there 
was differential treatment of employees within firms and whether this might have induced worker selection. 
While Earle and Sabirianova (2002) find that leading positions in firms suffered less from wage arrears, Gerry, 
Kim and Li (2004) claim that firm managers allocated wage arrears according to equity principles, implying that 
the least earning workers were spared. To the opposite, Lehmann et al. (1999) find that regional and firm 
characteristics are strong predictors for wage arrears, while individual characteristics play a negligible role. All 
three papers use data from Russia and the only evidence on Ukraine from the 1990s reveals that personal 
characteristics play no significant role in the determination of wage arrears, while economic sector and regional 
location of the employee explain the incidence of arrears quite accurately (Boyarchuk, Maliar and Maliar, 2005). 
7 local concentration of wage arrears diminished incentives to completely change employers. 
This added to a generally low mobility of workers across jobs and sectors in transition 
economies (Boeri and Flinn, 1999). When insurance and outside job options are missing, 
leaving the region might be regarded as an alternative strategy in response to wage non-
payment. Yet, mobility rates in transition countries were generally low and even declining 
despite a substantial rise in regional disparities (Fidrmuc, 2004).
12 These specific features of 
the regional labor markets make secondary activities a plausible alternative for risk 
diversification. 
In Ukraine, the incidence of wage arrears peaked at the end of the 1990s and declined 
thereafter. Survey evidence for 1996 and 1999 shows that two third of employees suffered 
from wage arrears in both years (Boyarchuk, Maliar and Maliar, 2005). According to the 
International Labor Organisation, the average Ukrainian employee was owed the amount of 
six monthly wage payments in the 1990s (ILO, 1996). Figure 1 illustrates that wage shocks in 
the form of aggregate wage arrears were very high in the late 1990s. Starting at this extreme 
incidence of wage non-payment, many Ukrainians were paid back outstanding wages during 
the period of strong economic growth in the early 2000s. Still, the sum of wages owed by 
current employers exceeded 1 percent of annual GDP in the years 2003 and 2004.
13  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
Generally, there is no evidence of systematic sorting of workers across firms as a consequence of wage arrears 
(Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). 
12 Reasons which may explain the low labor mobility and thus contribute to the persistence of shocks in certain 
regions include liquidity constraints, high search costs, administrative barriers and underdeveloped housing 
markets (Andrienko and Guriev, 2004). 
13 As these aggregate figures exclude wage arrears from previous employers, they are likley to be 
underestimated. 
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Note: Unfortunately, no official statistics exist on wage arrears prior to 1997. Source: State Statistics Committee 
of Ukraine (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/), own calculations. 
 
 
The repayment of arrears is one aspect that has been largely ignored in the literature. 
Such paybacks did not only happen to employees who suffered from wage arrears with their 
current employer but also to former employees who had left the firm in the past. Observations 
from employer records and employee data indicate that repayments were “occasional and 
lumpy” (Earle, Spicer and Sabirianova, 2004: 6). As no general bargaining process about the 
repayment of wage arrears took place in Ukraine, the repayment decision has been taken by 
the firm management on a monthly basis. So, depending on the predominant nature and cause 
for wage arrears (liquidity constraints and/or managerial behavior), the repayment decision 
might or might not be at the manager’s discretion.
14 From the perspective of the individual 
these repayments can be considered unanticipated. Some employees might not even work in 
the indebted firm any longer and still receive a repayment. If negative wage shocks had a 
causal and positive impact on secondary activities and if these activities were predominantly 
used to fill the earnings gap, the repayment of wage shocks should have the opposite effect on 
                                                 
14 A simple test of the randomness of repayments is performed with the data set and variables described below: 
In a multivariate regression of the determinants of arrear repayments, none of the various demographic, job, firm 
and regional controls delivers a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. This 
indeed suggests that repayments had little structure. 
9 labor supply. Thus, using repayment information as the analogue of wage shocks permits 
shedding light on the true motivation for second job holdings. 
 
2.3  Secondary Activities 
Generally, work relations are still relatively inflexible in Ukraine. The main source of 
rigidity is the strict Labor Code which has been in place since the Soviet era and which 
regulates the working week to comprise 40 hours. Part-time arrangements are still the 
exception. However, there are two sources of flexibility in the labor market: On the one hand, 
there are increasing numbers of opportunities for employees to engage in second jobs in 
dependent employment. Most second jobs comprise professional occupations (43%), followed 
by manual (34%) and service occupations (23%). The sectors were most second job 
employers operate are education, sales and maintenance, health, and other service activities 
(56%), agriculture (19%), transport (8%), construction (6%) and are available throughout the 
country; however, while only 1.6% of employees in villages hold a second job, the fraction is 
typically much larger in towns and urban areas with up to 13.6% of employees in some cities. 
On the other hand, many Ukrainians have opportunities for growing food on household plots 
(subsidiary farming). Plot farming has a long tradition in Ukraine and other countries of the 
former Soviet Union and is widespread in rural areas. In villages, more than 90% of 
employees engage in at least some food production on a regular basis, while these numbers 
are much lower in large cities—for instance only 10% of employees in the cities of Lviv and 
Kiev. Farming requires access to plots and the availability of land naturally limits the 
potential to use farming as a coping strategy. While these limitations are serious in cities, 
availability of land is generally unproblematic in rural areas and small towns.
15 Yet, starting 
to produce food as a response to wage shortfalls is probably limited. Therefore we may expect 
little response at the extensive margin for subsidiary farming (and if so only in areas where 
access to land is good and prior engagement in farming imperfect, i.e. in small towns). More 
easily, members of households that are already engaged in subsidiary farming could 
potentially expand their activities (given that the survey was predominantly collected during 
the agricultural season).  
 
                                                 
15 Due to a land sale moratorium, most plots are rented in. 
10 3  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Most of the following analysis rests on two waves from a relatively new panel data set, 
the nationally representative Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) for the 
years 2003 and 2004. The ULMS is a rich data source combining individual level information 
on socio-demographic characteristics with extensive labor-related data (Lehmann and Terrell, 
2006).
16 In addition, a household questionnaire collects rich information on household 
composition, assets, income and consumption.
17 After carefully cleaning the data and 
restricting the sample to a balanced panel of prime age employees (17 to 60 years) who are 
working throughout both waves, 1,736 individuals per year provide complete employment 
and working hours information. Professional farmers, self-employed and family helpers are 
excluded from the sample as wages and hence wage shocks are harder to define in their cases. 
All individuals in the sample are employed and have worked for at least one hour in the 
reference week and were paid or supposed to be paid a wage.
18 This implies the exclusion of 
employees on sick or maternity leave or in holidays. A variable overview for the sample can 
be found in Table A1. 
Additional data come from cross-sectional waves of the nationally representative 
Ukrainian Household Budget Survey (UHBS) which collects information on 25,000 
individuals and 9,000 households on an annual basis. The data comprise a rich set of 
individual and household characteristics, information on employment as well as incomes. The 
UHBS is here mainly used for estimating wage shock exposure and for imputing household 
consumption. It provides information which is highly comparable to that of the ULMS but 
includes more accurate indicators for outstanding wages from current and previous 
employers. 
 
                                                 
16 The data were collected using multi-stage random sampling. If households moved between years, they were 
not followed across administrative regions (oblasts). 
17 In 2003, information on household consumption was collected only rudimentary. Thus household consumption 
values for 2003 and 2004 are imputed from the extensive questionnaire on food, service and durables 
consumption in UHBS. This questionnaire is highly comparable to the one used in the ULMS household survey 
in 2004. To check the robustness of the imputations for 2004, consumption values from UHBS and ULMS for 
that year are compared indicating a very strong positive correlation (coefficient: 0.663; the R² in a simple 
regression is above 99 percent). 
18 The overall share of employed persons in the survey rose from 45.7 percent to 47.3 percent between 2003 and 
2004. 
11 3.1  Wage Shock and Labor Supply Variables 
Wage uncertainty is measured by worker-specific wage shocks which are defined as 
wage payments that fall short of the contractual wage despite the fulfillment of contractual 
work requirements. In other words, employees who report working normal hours in the 
reference week (normal in comparison to their ‘work effort in an ordinary working week’) but 
are paid no or a significantly lower wage than the contractually fixed amount and who report 
that their employer owes them wage income, are classified as individuals suffering from wage 
arrears. As also found for Russia (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002), wage arrears in the ULMS 
data set exhibit a strong regional character. While some regions have a wage arrears incidence 
of below 1 percent, up to 52 percent of employees were still affected in other areas in the 
2003/2004 period. The variation across sectors is also substantial. While ‘only’ 4 percent of 
employees in public administration suffered from wage arrears, more than every third 
agricultural worker was affected (Table 1). Also, the conditional stock of back wages ranges 
regionally from around one up to six months and was especially high in the transport, 
agricultural and construction sectors.  
 














Agriculture 35.0%  3.7  2.0%  85.8% 
Industry 14.5%  2.1  2.1%  57.8% 
Electricity 12.8%  0.9  2.6%  64.4% 
Construction 5.6%  2.7  2.8%  50.0% 
Sale 4.7%  1.5  2.5%  48.9% 
Transport 6.2%  5.9  2.3%  65.5% 
Financial services  8.5%  2.2  4.3%  38.3% 
Public administration  4.1%  0.6  3.7%  63.0% 
Education 4.3%  0.8  2.7%  65.6% 
Other Services  8.4%  1.6  2.8%  50.2% 
Other 6.9%  2.0  0.0%  42.1% 
Note: 3,472 observations. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
 
As all individuals in the sample are employed in their main job, labor supply is 
measured at the extensive margin by focusing on the participation decision in secondary 
activities. Table 1 reveals that second job holdings are much less common than subsidiary 
farming jobs, but both can be found across all economic sectors. At the intensive margin of 
labor supply, working hours in the secondary activities are analyzed along with main job and 
12 leisure hours. To impose as few assumptions as possible, leisure is defined as residual day 
time. The computation subtracts from 24 hours: eight hours of sleep, the working hours in 
main job, the working hours in other jobs and the time used for household food production. 
Although consistency in the time use data was checked carefully and individuals who report 
more than 99 hours of total work per week (including all sources of work) were excluded, 
some individuals end up with slightly negative leisure per day. In general, the calculation 
might still be correct, given that some individuals simply need less than eight hours for sleep 
and personal care per day. Nevertheless, a strict minimum of 0.1 hours of leisure per day is 
imposed in the analysis. 
 
3.2  Control Variables 
All regressions include as control variables individual characteristics (gender, age, age 
squared/100, years of education, marital status) as well as regional (oblast) and settlement 
type fixed effects and a common trend. To account for the time budget constraint and 
exceptional work load during the reference period the natural logarithm of hours worked in 
the main job is added as control. Further covariates include job characteristics (economic 
sector of work, enterprise ownership
19), different income measures (log of non-labor income, 
the hourly wage rate and the second job shadow wage
20) and a wealth (asset) indicator. Some 
attention should be paid to the construction of the income, wage and welfare variables. As a 
main job specific control variable, the hourly wage rate is constructed from contractual 
monthly wage income divided by contractual monthly working hours. This variable thus 
reflects how well a job would be paid under normal working and payment conditions. The 
analysis accounts for non-labor income by using total consumption net of all members’ labor 
incomes. To use household consumption rather than income helps to clean the analysis from 
regular consumption smoothing activities (e.g. continuous household production of food from 
small agricultural land plots) (cp. Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Furthermore, given that in 
some households not all working age members provided income information (for reasons like 
                                                 
19 A variable indicating union membership status was not used in the regressions as it never came out significant. 
20 The second job wage rate is obviously unobserved for those not holding a second job. Therefore a reduced 
form regression of the second job wage rate for second job holders is performed in order to predict a shadow 
wage for the entire sample. This procedure may later introduce selectivity bias as actual wages offered to those 
not holding a second job might be structurally lower than the ones offered to second job holders. As a 
consequence of this overprediction µ2 will be biased towards zero. Different from studies where individuals are 
predominantly hours constrained (Shishko and Rostker, 1976) the second job wage rate should play little role in 
this setting. All regressions have also been performed devoid of the second job shadow wage without any impact 
on the results. 
13 absence at the interview date or refusal to participate in the survey), consumption seems the 
more reliable measure. Household wealth is controlled for by a composite measure of ten 
durable goods (e.g., refrigerator, washing machine, car etc.). Using principle component 
analysis, the set of assets is transformed into an asset indicator which accounts for more than 
57 percent of the overall variance in asset holdings. The correlation matrix of single assets 
with the first principal component is reported in Table A2. 
 
4  Methodology 
4.1  The Labor Supply Equation 
The main challenge of this research is to draw inference about the causal impact of 
unanticipated wage shocks on labor supply. If wage shocks γ were purely random, one could 
simply compare the change in second job holdings y (second job or subsidiary farming) over 
time between those employees ‘treated’ with a wage shocks (γ=1) and those without a wage 
shock (γ=0). Including as covariates the wage rates w1, w2 from the main and second job
21 
and household wealth A as well as individual characteristics X and firm and region controls J 
gives the following formulation of the labor supply equation:  
yit = α + β’Xit + δ1 γit + δ2 dt + µ1 w1it + µ2 w2it + µ3 Ait + σ’ Jit + εit     1  
for      i ∈ {1, ..., n}, t ∈ {2003, 2004}    
The estimator of interest δ1 compares the conditional propensity of holding a second 
job between individuals who experienced a wage shock with those without shock. As we 
expect wage shocks to push workers into second jobs, δ1 should carry a positive sign. The 
period dummy dt captures general time trends like nationwide changes to the demand for and 
acceptability of second job holdings (e.g. employers in Ukraine might be increasingly ready 
to employ workers on the basis of contracts with few hours per week). Initially, equation (1) 
is estimated in a pooled OLS set-up with individual clustered standard errors. The hours 
equation makes use of a normal rather than a log-log specification to implicitly account for 
non-participation (Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) and is estimated 
with a censored Tobit model with clustered standard errors. Such a model assumes that the 
                                                 
21 No shadow wage has been imputed for subsidiary farming as producer food prices are unavailable. 
14 participation decision and the hours decision are produced by the same econometric process 
and that individuals who do not supply any labor to a second job simply chose zero hours. To 
test the robustness of the estimated effects, two model specifications are used throughout all 
main results. The first model employs only pre-determined demographic characteristics like 
age, gender, education and pre-determined location controls. The second model is being 
nested in the first and removes the parameter restrictions on all other covariates by adding all 
remaining individual and job characteristics as well as measures for non-labor income and 
asset wealth.
22  
All estimates might be biased if unobservable (and thus uncontrolled) factors 
influenced both, the probability to suffer from a wage shock and the probability to take on a 
second job. As a start, it is useful to think about the character of this bias and detect the 
potential direction of its impact. One would expect that firm managers might impose wage 
arrears on their less productive workers first, thus discriminating between workers of different 
levels of ability or conscientiousness. The firm manager might be doing so, as she is able to 
observe what remains unobservable to the researcher. In general, we expect that low levels of 
ability or conscientiousness are negatively correlated with holding a second job, as second job 
employers value similar characteristics as main job employers. Then, however, estimates 
which cannot adequately account for unobservables should be downward rather than upward 
biased.  
Using panel data permits to control for unobservable individual characteristics. So, the 
main econometric specification will account for individual heterogeneity by estimating (1) as 
a fixed effects panel data model. In this way it is possible to remove any time-invariant 
factors which potentially bias standard OLS. For the analysis of second job working hours, 
the preferred model is the random-effects Tobit panel model.
23  
In order to take into account the possibility of measurement error in the shock 
variable, a more comprehensive wage arrear measure from the larger UHBS data set is 
exploited: it contains information on outstanding wages in the current job (as in the ULMS) as 
well as from previous jobs. Similar to the ULMS, the UHBS asks respondents to indicate the 
                                                 
22 In order to test whether the more complex nested model has additional explanatory power, likelihood ratio 
(LR) tests are performed for the main tables. The reported p-values refer to the hypothesis that the simpler model 
is a valid representation for the nested model. In all cases, the LR test suggests the superiority of the more 
complex specification. 
23 In addition a fixed-effects linear panel model is employed in order to show the robustness of the results for 
second job hours. This, however, estimates responses to wage shocks for the uncensored sample and will deliver 
coefficients that cannot be converted into effects for the sample under consideration (therefore these results are 
reported for illustrative purposes in Table A3 in the Appendix). It should be noted that censoring is strong for 
second jobs but not for subsidiary farming. 
15 volume of outstanding wages while providing a much larger sample size. Hence wage shocks 
can be measured quite accurately. The general model is again: 
yit = β’Xit + δ1 γit + αi + εit            2    
As this model is endangered to suffer from incorrectly measured wage shock 
information γ, an instrument Z is employed. As the measurement problem cannot be solved in 
the ULMS data set, auxiliary data (the UHBS) are used from which one can impute the wage 
shock risk for the ULMS. The incidence of complete wage shocks (including arrears from 
previous employers) is regressed on sector and region dummies in the UHBS data and then 
predicted for ULMS observations as an instrument for wage uncertainty.
24 In order to 
estimate the parameter of interest (δ1) in the second stage, the first stage exploits the 
conditional relationship between the observed wage shock variable and the assigned wage risk 
information: 
γit  = β’Xit + λ Zit + uit            3    
This instrumental variable approach is estimated with generalized two-stage least 
squares estimation (G2SLS) for panel data. As will be shown below, a Hausman test suggests 
a preference for the more efficient random-effects panel model.  
Albeit panel and IV methods correct different kinds of biases here, neither is as 
conceptually straightforward as a quasi-experiment. One such experiment is represented by 
the exogenous repayment of outstanding wages. Luckily, the availability of pay-back 
information in Ukraine offers the unique opportunity to exploit exogenous variation in firms’ 
wage policies to understand the effect of wage shocks at the employee level over the entire 
cycle of wage shocks.
25  
 
                                                 
24 A matrix of 26 regions and 12 economic sectors is used in order to estimate wage shocks. To check the 
estimation fit in the prediction sample, a cross-validation of the prediction quality is performed by splitting the 
UHBS sample randomly and predicting the respective variable for the second part of the sample. The cross-
validity coefficient of both sub samples is of reasonable size (+0.35). 
25 In the UHBS data, 14 percent of repayments are directed to employees who have wage arrears with their 
current employer, while the substantial remaining share is received by those who have no arrears with the current 
but a former employer.  
16 4.2  The Consumption Smoothing Equation 
The final part of this paper addresses the question how successful credit constrained 
households use secondary activities to smooth consumption. If the estimated effect of wage 
shocks on labor supply was causal (i.e. employees ultimately respond to wage shocks) the 
consumption smoothing mechanism of second job holdings should be traceable in the data. 
Similar to the previous literature, this paper uses a household fixed effects consumption 
model which can be consistently estimated even in a two-period set-up (Attanasio and 
Székely, 2004): 
Δlogcj = δ1Δlogyj + δ2Δsj + δ3Δlj + δ4Δ(lj*sj) + δ5Δ(fj*sj) + β’ΔXj + εj ;  j є {1,..., n}   4  
Under the absence of any consumption smoothing, the coefficient δ1 is expected to 
converge to one, as consumption of household j perfectly covaries with available income. In 
perfect insurance markets, the coefficient should not be different from zero, as consumption is 
entirely independent of income. Furthermore, if insurance mechanisms were fully at work, 
transitory shocks sj should have no impact on the level of consumption, thus the coefficient of 
wage shocks δ2 should be zero. On the other hand, if the coefficient is statistically significant 
different from zero and negative, transitory shocks seem not only to be unanticipated but also 
ex-ante uninsurable. At the centre of interest here are the terms reflecting the response to 
shocks (lj*sj) and (fj*sj) where lj is an indicator for second job holdings and fj for subsidiary 
farming. The sign of δ4 and δ5 contains information on whether households that respond to 
wage shocks by increasing their labor supply in a second activity can compensate for the 
income loss and smooth out consumption. If δ2+δ3+δ4+δ5<0, households cannot entirely 
shield their consumption against wage shocks. If δ2+δ3+δ4+δ5=0, households exactly 
compensate for their income loss and if δ2+δ3+δ4+δ5>0, households are on average able to 
overcompensate their loss. The fixed effects regressions also control for household size and 
regional characteristics like access to finance
26, which are subsumed under X.  
                                                 
26 Access to finance is measured as the regional share of households who either use a savings or lending facility 
at a bank. It should be noted, that households might potentially use savings to smooth out consumption. 
However, the Russian financial crisis of 1998/1999 depleted most of these savings. 
17 5  Results 
The results of the empirical analysis are presented and discussed in the following 
order: The first subsection provides a descriptive overview of the relationship between and 
the determinants of the main variables of interest—wage shocks and secondary activities. 
Then the causal effect of wage shocks on second job holdings is estimated, before the analysis 
proceeds to the implementation of an IV approach in order to account for measurement error. 
The final subsection turns to the role of wage shocks and coping mechanisms in the 
consumption smoothing framework. 
 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Those who currently suffer from a wage shock are more likely to engage in a 
secondary activity. The top panel of Table 2 indicates that employees who experience wage 
arrears have a 72 percent higher incidence of second jobs and a 12 percent higher incidence of 
farming activities. Also working hours are significantly higher for employees with wage 
shocks.  
Wage arrears are not very persistent over time and across individuals. Panel B. of 
Table 2 shows that entry to and exit from wage arrears status are substantial between the 
years. Well above half of employees who suffered from a wage shock in 2003 do not report 
any similar incidence in 2004, while 4 percent of employees without previous shocks 
experience wage arrears in 2004. The substantial variation of wage arrears across individuals 
over time is a crucial prerequisite for the outlined estimation strategy. It suggests that shocks 
were not permanently concentrated among the same employees. Given the strong growth of 
the economy in the early 2000s (see Figure 1) employees were probably not expecting wage 
shocks in a way they might have been prepared for during the period of high shock incidence 
in the 1990s. The crucial issue of employees’ anticipation will be more thoroughly addressed 
in Section 6 of this paper. 
Panel C. of the table shows the share of employees holding a second job in 2004 by 
the same four cells of the wage arrears matrix. It becomes evident that those who have no 
wage arrears in 2004 are less likely to engage in a second job, no matter whether they suffered 
from insecure income in 2003. Their share of second job holders is around 2 percent. 
Employees who suffer from wage shocks in both years are more likely to hold a second job 
(2.7 percent). However, the highest second job holdings are recorded for those who have 
wage shocks in 2004 but not in 2003. Six percent of them have a second job, suggesting that 
the non-anticipated incidence of shocks might be the main driving force behind the observed 
18 labor supply pattern. The pattern for subsidiary farming is quite different: Rather than current 
shock incidence, last year’s experience seems to matter. This might be plausible given the 
difficulties in land access and the inflexibility inherent to this coping strategy.
27 Although 
these unconditional results suggest that secondary activities and wage shocks are related, they 
do not imply any causal relationship so far.  
Before proceeding to the estimation of the shock response model it seems crucial to 
gain a better understanding of the general determinants of second job holdings and wage 
arrears. The determinants of wage shocks can shed light on whether arrears exhibit a pattern 
of regional and sectoral concentration, as suggested by the previous literature on Russia. 
Similarly, the determinants of secondary activities can suggest whether this kind of 
employment is predominantly used by specific groups of employees.  
Table 3 shows determinants of wage arrears in Ukraine based on a simple pooled 
Probit model with individually clustered robust standard errors. Wage shocks are weakly 
associated with gender and are more common among workers in their late 40s. The latter 
finding is intuitive as the bonding effect exerted by arrears is stronger for older workers who 
have already invested more in job and firm specific skills. Better off employees seem to have 
a lower propensity to face wage arrears as indicated by the negative coefficient of the asset 
variable. The main determinants of wage shock, however, seem to be region, sector and firm 
effects with patterns that are in line with the previous literature (cp. Lehmann, et al., 1999). 
The table also provides evidence on the determinants of secondary activities. Given 
that overall only about 3 percent of employees hold a second job, the marginal effects are 
small. Human capital and wealth are the main determinants of second job holdings, while 
farming activities are correlated with region and sector characteristics. As expected, the 
imputed second job shadow wage is positively correlated with second job holdings, but the 
effect is almost negligible in size. An increase in the average second job hourly wage rate 
from 10 UAH by 1 UAH (a plus of ten percent) would only imply an increase in the 
propensity of holding a second job by 1.3 percent. Individual characteristics like gender, age 
and marital status seem to play no significant role for second jobs but for subsidiary farming 
activities where women and older workers are more likely to be engaged in.
28 Two aspects 
deserve special attention. First, employees who work fewer hours per week are more likely to 
                                                 
27 Having started a farming activity in the past might require further labor input beyond the termination date of 
the shock. Such prolonged coping seems quite realistic given that the average shock lasts around five months 
while the agricultural season might be longer.  
28 An additional specification shows that married women are less likely to hold a second job. 
19 perform a subsidiary activity. As will be shown later, this coefficient reflects a labor 
substitution between main job and coping activity in the presence of wage shocks rather than 
additional activities of workers who are involuntarily time constrained in the main job. 
Second, non-labor household income and assets promote secondary activities. While both 
coping strategies might be used against wage uncertainty in the main job, second jobs are 
more common among the better-off and farming jobs are more widespread in rural areas.  
 
Table 2: Incidence and intensity of secondary activities by wage shock status  
 
Panel A.         
Participation in  Second job holdings  Subsidiary farming    
Currently no wage arrear  2.2%  60.7%     






(0.027)***    
Hours worked per week in
a  Second job  Subsidiary farming    
Currently no wage arrear  4.5  15.2     






(0.96)***    
Panel B.       
Transition matrix  No wage arrear 2004  Wage arrear 2004  Total 
No wage arrear 2003  96.0%  4.0%    100% 
Wage arrear 2003  56.9%  43.1%    100% 
Panel C. 
Second job holdings in 2004       
  No wage arrear 2004  Wage arrear 2004  Δ within row 
No wage arrear 2003  2.2%  6.0%    3.8%-p. (0.014)***
Wage arrear 2003  2.4%  2.7%    0.3%-p. (0.015) 
Δ within column  0.3%-p. (0.010)  -3.2%-p. (0.023)*     
Subsidiary farming in 2004       
  No wage arrear 2004  Wage arrear 2004  Δ within row 
No wage arrear 2003  60.3%  64.4%    4.1%-p. (0.046) 
Wage arrear 2003  70.6%  66.7%    -3.9%-p. (0.045) 
Δ within column  10.2%-p. (0.032)***  2.3%-p. (0.056)     
a conditional on participating in activity   
Note: Based on balanced panel of 3,472 observations. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
 
20 Table 3: Determinants of wage arrears and secondary activities 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 
(3) 
Dependent variable  Wage arrear  Second job holding 
 
Subsidiary farming
 Probit  Probit  Probit 
Female -0.022*  0.003  0.044* 
 (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.024) 
Age 0.010**  0.002  0.018** 
 (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.008) 
Age squared/100  -0.011**  -0.002  -0.015 
 (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.010) 
Adjusted years of schooling  0.004*  0.002**  0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Centre 0.083**  -0.006  0.323*** 
 (0.043)  (0.008)  (0.038) 
West 0.039  0.017  0.316*** 
 (0.039)  (0.016)  (0.036) 
East 0.133***  0.002  0.326*** 
 (0.046)  (0.009)  (0.039) 
South 0.048  0.012  0.252*** 
 (0.038)  (0.012)  (0.044) 
Asset indicator  -0.010***  0.002  0.014* 
 (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.008) 
Log of non-labor income  0.001  0.007***  -0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
Log of main job working hours    -0.012**  -0.086*** 
   (0.005)  (0.032) 




Industry   0.052**  0.003  0.087** 
 (0.027)  (0.010)  (0.038) 
Education   -0.047**  0.000  0.085** 
 (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.037) 
Agriculture   0.208***  0.010  0.119** 
 (0.052)  (0.017)  (0.045) 
De novo private firm  -0.037**  0.008  -0.069* 
 (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.036) 
Village -0.006  -0.003  0.454*** 
 (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.018) 
Town -0.013  0.001  0.235*** 
 (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.021) 
Time   -0.034***  0.002  -0.042*** 
 (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.015) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.129  0.023  0.237 
Observations 3472  3472  3472 
Note: Marginal effects reported. Base categories are ‘Kiev region’, ‘large city’, ‘state enterprise’, ‘service 
sector’. All other coefficients on ‘married’, ‘privatized firm’, ‘national/international organization’, ‘Electricity’, 
‘Construction’, ‘Sale’, ‘Transport’, ‘Administration’, and ‘Finance’ sector were insignificant. Robust standard 
errors clustered by individual ID are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, 
own calculations.  
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5.2  Estimating the Effect of Wage Shocks on Secondary Activities 
In the following we turn to the response of secondary activities to transitory wage 
shocks. Table 4 reports results for different measures of wage arrears: a binary variable 
indicating the presence of a shortfall of wages due to arrears (wage shock), the intensity of 
wage shocks (measured as stock of outstanding monthly wages), an indicator for the receipt 
of wage repayment
29 and an indicator for the receipt of other positive wage shocks. The table 
shows only the marginal effects of interest from regressions with several specifications. The 
top panel comprises results for the naive pooled OLS estimation of equation (1), while the 
bottom contains results from fixed effects regressions. Columns 1 and 3 control only for 
exogenous demographic factors, while columns 2 and 4 add the remaining demographic, job 
and welfare controls. The complete list of estimated coefficients of all regressors is provided 
in Tables A4, A5a and A5b in the Appendix, which also contains the results based on 
specification-specific maximal samples.  
Second job holdings are 2.3 percentage points higher among employees with wage 
shocks and these results are hardly affected by the inclusion of job and wealth controls. The 
coefficient on shock intensity is positive, yet, insignificant. On the opposite, the repayment of 
back wages significantly lowers the propensity to work in a second job and, interestingly, the 
size of the coefficient is almost identical to the coefficient indicating the incidence of a wage 
shock. Although these estimates are no more than correlations so far, this pattern might 
suggest that the onset of a shock increase second job holdings, while the termination of the 
shock reduces second jobs by the same rate. Such a co-movement of second job holdings with 
wage arrears might be an indicator for a causal relationship. Finally, the analysis investigates 
whether the repayment effect on second job holdings is simply driven by higher incomes. If 
this was the case, higher than usual wage payments like bonus payments or gratuities should 
have a similarly discouraging effect on second job holdings. However, positive wage shocks 
other than wage repayments seem to be uncorrelated with second job holdings. Although all 
estimates for subsidiary farming show the expected signs none of them is significant in this 
specification.  
If unobservable ability was negatively related to the propensity to suffer from a wage 
shock but positively correlated to the propensity of holding a second job, the coefficients from 
pooled OLS would be downward biased. As described earlier, the omitted variable (OV) is 
                                                 
29 Wage repayment means the explicit repayment of owed wages, not the return to scheduled monthly payment. 
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expected to be negatively correlated with wages shocks but positively correlated with second 
job holdings. As the estimated coefficient on wage shocks in (1) is positive (Corr(OV, γ) < 0 
and δ1 > 0), δ1 suffers from a negative bias. To account for this unobservable ability, fixed 
effects are included in the estimation. The results reported in the lower panel of Table 4 show 
that the causal impact of wage arrears on second job holdings becomes substantially larger 
and remains statistically significant compared to OLS.
30 Depending on the specification, the 
coefficient is 13 to 22 percent larger when accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. As Table 
4 further reveals, the intensity of wage shocks becomes now highly significant indicating that 
each additional month of outstanding wages increases the probability of holding a second job 
by 0.6 percent. The coefficient from the wage shock dummy specification is 4.7 times larger 
than the coefficient in the intensity regressions, indicating that the average employee suffering 
from a wage shock is owed 4.7 monthly wages. This number is indeed quite close to the 
conditional sample mean for the shock intensity (see Table A1). The effect of wage 
repayment becomes much larger in the fixed effects regression while other forms of positive 
wage shocks remain insignificant, underlining that the estimated effects on second job 
holdings cannot be simply attributed to additional income. 
The incidence of wage shocks in the main job has a strong and positive significant 
effect on subsidiary farming activities of employees residing in towns. The propensity to 
engage in farming ranges between 13 and 16 percent. None of the intensity, repayment or 
positive wage shock estimates turns out to be significant. While this might indicate that 
individuals with access to land enter a continuous coping strategy, the lack of precision might 
also stem from the limited size of the respective subsample. 
 
 
30 The effect is significant in villages and towns as well as in large cities, where it is strongest (Table A7).  
Table 4: Impact of wage shocks on secondary activities (extensive margin) 
  
    (1)   (2)    (3)    (4)    






























OLS model  Wage shock  0.023**  0.016    0.024** 0.020    0.009  0.103    0.017  0.126   
   (0.011)      (0.011)      (0.046)      (0.047)     
  Intensity of shock  0.004  0.018    0.004  0.022    0.003  0.103    0.003  0.126   
   (0.003)      (0.003)      (0.003)      (0.003)     
 Repayment    -0.021**  0.013    -0.025***  0.018    -0.359  0.104    -0.275  0.126   
   (0.009)      (0.009)      (0.349)      (0.372)     
 Positive  shock  0.035  0.014    0.019  0.018   0.027  0.103   0.011  0.126   
   (0.034)      (0.034)      (0.137)      (0.134)     
FE model  Wage shock  0.028**  0.007  3616.0  0.027**  0.022 3643.0  0.158*** 0.088 121.2 0.128**  0.115  134.6 
   (0.013)      (0.013)    (0.000)  (0.060)      (0.064)    (0.0315) 
  Intensity of shock  0.006***  0.013  3627.3  0.006***  0.028  3652.9  0.003  0.073  114.4  0.004  0.107  130.6 
   (0.002)      (0.002)    (0.000)  (0.006)      (0.006)    (0.0055) 
 Repayment    -0.202*** 0.008  3618.2  -0.195**  0.024  3645.2  -0.057  0.073  114.2  -0.111  0.107  130.4 
   (0.077)      (0.077)    (0.000)  (0.306)      (0.354)    (0.0056) 
 Positive  shock  -0.027  0.005  3612.8  -0.025  0.020 3639.4  0.055  0.073 114.3 0.102  0.108 130.9 
   (0.028)      (0.028)    (0.000)  (0.132)      (0.139)    (0.0045) 
 Demographic 
controls 
X    X    X     X   
  Job & welfare 
controls  
—   X    —     X    
 Observations  3472      3472      874      874     
Note: Wage shock is defined as current wage arrear. Intensity is measured in number of monthly payments. Sample for (3) and (4) comprises only households residing in towns. All 
regressions control for individual demographics and regional controls. LR test for regressions (1) vs. (2) and (3) vs. (4): Prob > Chi2 (df 18). Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered by id in OLS). 





   
Beside the second job participation decision, wage shocks might prompt individuals to 
intensify their activities in a previously existing second job. Table 5 presents the results from the 
intensive labor supply margin in a Tobit and random-effects Tobit framework (for the full list of 
regressors see Table A6). Individuals who already held a second job increase their labor supply 
by around 5 hours following a wage shock (columns 1-4), a very consistent estimate across the 
different specifications. This implies on average a doubling of second job hours after a wage 
shock. Hours in subsidiary farming increase by 2.3 to 4.7 hours (columns 5-8). Interestingly, the 
relationship between main job hours and hours in the secondary activity is comparatively small. 
One additional hour in the main employment is associated with second job holdings that are on 
average only one eighth of an hour lower. The effect is twice as large in subsidiary farming. 
These results probably reflect the low variation in hours of main job employment relations, 
where the vast majority of labor contracts are fixed at forty hours. 
From a policy perspective, it is relevant to understand the mechanism which underlies 
the increase in secondary activities or hours while employees are still employed in their main 
job. The question is whether workers simply add more effort and increase their overall working 
time at the expense of leisure or whether they re-allocate effort between jobs. On the one hand, 
it seems reasonable to assume that employees reduced main job effort in exchange for second 
job effort. On the other hand, the bonding effect of wage arrears might prevent them from 
reducing effort significantly or from quitting the main job altogether (as a corner solution). 
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Table 5: Impact of wage shocks on working hours in secondary activities (intensive margin) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7)  (8) 
 
Dependent variable  Working hours in second job  Working hours in subsidiary farming 








              
Wage shock  4.761***  4.631***  4.729**  5.066*** 4.661***  2.878**  3.932***  2.293** 
  (1.768) (1.779) (1.852) (1.917)  (1.161)  (1.215)  (1.257)  (1.112) 
Main job hours  -0.100*  -0.102*  -0.129**  -0.127**  -0.200***  -0.231***  -0.212***  -0.240*** 
  (0.058) (0.060) (0.062) (0.065)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.047) 
Log non-labor inc.    2.415***    2.483***    -0.063    -0.043 
   (0.680)  (0.690)    (0.238)    (0.246) 
Hourly wage main job    0.083    0.010    -0.632**    -0.587 
   (0.370)  (0.392)    (0.299)    (0.396) 
Demographic  controls  X X X X  X  X  X  X 
Job & wealth controls  —  X  —  X  —  X  —  X 
LL  -574.82 -561.89 -550.19 -532.27  -6287  -6256  -6224  -6198 
Prob > Chi2 (df 18)    0.0005    0.0074    0.0073    0.0120 
Pseudo R2 / Chi2  0.034  0.056  27.2  33.7  0.0319  0.0367  312.1  1161 
Observations  3472 3472 3472 3472  1834  1834  1834  1834 
Note: Share of uncensored observations: 2.35%. The quadrature approximation of the RE Tobit model was checked using the ‘quadchk’ command in Stata. Sample for models (5) 
to (8) comprises only households in towns and villages. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
26 Furthermore, the hours constraint formulated earlier does not allow employees to provide 
unlimited additional effort while being still employed in the risky main job. Table 6 therefore 
also presents marginal fixed effects of main job hours and leisure with respect to wage shocks. 
Suffering from a wage shock reduces main job hours supply by roughly 5 percent (columns 1-
3). Given that virtually all Ukrainians work 40 hours per week, the reduction of working time 
equals 1.9 hours per week. This reduction is smaller than the associated increase in second job 
labor supply implying that individuals must also reduce their available leisure time (columns 4-
6). On a weekly basis, the reduction ranges between 3.4 and 3.6 hours, depending on the 
specification. Dividing the sample into three groups of individuals according to settlement type 
shows that the reduction in main job and leisure hours takes place predominantly in villages and 
towns where it amounts to minus 6.6 percent and minus 4.5 percent, respectively (Table A7).
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This is consistent with the availability of subsidiary farming opportunities in these areas.  
So far we have seen that the incidence of wage shocks causes employees to engage in 
secondary activities, while the subsequent repayment of outstanding wages significantly reduces 
the likelihood of having a second job (but not of subsidiary farming). Table 7 adds another piece 
of evidence to this cycle of entry and exit from second jobs by looking at the timing of the 
events. While an adverse wage shock immediately reduces the disposable household income, the 
search for a second job opportunity or the start of farming activities might be time-consuming. 
Table 7 therefore reports current labor supply responses as a function of the timing of the shock. 
As before, a current wage shock has a positive impact on second job holdings of around 2 
percent and a marginally insignificant effect on subsidiary farming. A shock that took place 
three to six months ago increases second job holdings and subsidiary farming twice as strong, 
probably reflecting the individuals’ response time to the shock. Wage non-payments that arrived 
for the first time nine to twelve months ago have no significant impact on current secondary 
coping activities which appears reasonable given that wage shocks were relatively short lived 
(on average 5.2 months). Again, this labor supply response pattern supports the idea that second 
job holdings are co-moving with wage shocks.   
                                                 
31 While the top panel of Table 6 does not account for the main job hourly wage, the bottom panel also includes job 
characteristics. One of these characteristics is the log of the contractual hourly wage rate. As this variable is 
endogenous, the mean wage of employees of a specific educational level in a specific industry is used as an 
instrument. The IV estimation produces relatively large standard errors. The Marshallian wage elasticity of main 
job working hours is negative but not statistically significant different from zero. It suggests that employees do not 
adapt their working time in response to shifts in their earnings profiles. This seems reasonable as employees are 
severely constrained in their working time choices. It should be noted, that this elasticity does not make any 





Table 6: Responses in main job working hours and leisure 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dependent variables  Log of main job hours  Log of leisure hours 
    FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Wage shock  -0.047*      -0.055**      Without job and wealth 
controls    (0.026)    (0.023)    
  Shock  intensity   -0.002    -0.004  
     (0.003)    (0.003)  
  Repayment       -0.123    0.026 
       (0.157)     (0.137) 
  Log of main job hours        -0.433***  -0.431***  -0.431*** 
         (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
  LL  1135.04 1132.12 1132.45 1593.05 1589.57 1587.27 
  R-squared  0.006 0.004 0.004 0.198 0.197 0.196 
  Implied change in hours  -1.9      -3.4     
With job and wealth controls  Wage shock  -0.047*      -0.057**     
    (0.026)    (0.023)    
  Shock  intensity   -0.002    -0.003  
     (0.003)    (0.003)  
  Repayment       -0.135    0.013 
       (0.157)     (0.138) 
  Log of main job hours        -0.477***  -0.472***  -0.471*** 
         (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
  Log of hourly wage  -0.026  -0.024  -0.023  -0.016***  -0.014***  -0.014*** 
    (0.054) (0.054) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
  LL  1145.67 1142.74 1143.22 1631.05 1625.99 1624.75 
  R-squared  0.012 0.010 0.010 0.216 0.214 0.213 
  Implied change in hours  -1.9      -3.6     
  LR test, Prob > Chi2 (df 18)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  Number of observations  3472  3472  3472  3472  3472  3472 
Note: Mean leisure hours (week): 62.4; mean main job working hours (week): 40.9. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own 
calculations.  Table 7: Response time to wage shocks 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Dependent variable  Second job holding 
  RE RE RE RE RE RE 
Current wage shock  0.023***      0.024***     
  (0.009)    (0.009)    
Shock 3-6 months ago    0.039***      0.038***   
   (0.013)    (0.014)  
Shock 9-12 months ago      0.026      0.023 
     (0.017)    (0.017) 
Hausman test, chi2  12.25  14.41  14.75  20.42  22.05  22.33 
df  10 10 10 26 26 26 
Rho  0.351 0.349 0.350 0.350 0.348 0.349 
Chi2 of model  39.63  40.93  34.62  67.32  68.24  61.98 
R-squared  0.014 0.015 0.013 0.023 0.024 0.022 
Observations  3472 3472 3472 3472 3472 3472 
        
Dependent variable  Subsidiary farming job 
  RE RE RE RE RE RE 
Current wage shock  0.035
†    0.033    
  (0.023)    (0.025)    
Shock 3-6 months ago    0.063**      0.061**   
   (0.030)    (0.030)  
Shock 9-12 months ago      0.052      0.050 
     (0.037)    (0.038) 
Hausman test, chi2  3.09  3.32  2.70  22.87  21.84  21.11 
df  6 6 6  18  18  18 
Rho  0.401 0.400 0.400 0.403 0.402 0.402 
Chi2 of model  199.2  198.8  197.9  16748  16647  16563 
R-squared  0.130 0.130 0.130 0.133 0.134 0.133 
Observations  1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Demographic  controls  X X X X X X 
Job & wealth controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Note: Due to smaller sample size in the subsidiary farming model, some variables were removed from the model 
(place dummies, firm ownership). Critical value for df(6): 12.6, df(10): 18.3, df(18): 28.9 and for df(26): 38.9 at 
the 5% significance level. Robust standard errors clustered by id in parentheses. Hausman test is performed on 
unclustered data; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
† p<0.15. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
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5.3  Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Previous results have shown that the incidence of a wage shock increases the 
propensity to hold a secondary activity and the working hours therein. These results might be 
confounded by measurement error in the right hand side variable thus attenuating the 
estimated coefficient of interest. The relevant coefficient will then appear closer to zero than 
the true estimate. To solve the potential bias from measurement error in the shock variable an 
instrumental variable approach is applied. Table 8 and Table 9 show instrumental variable 
estimates for both the extensive and intensive margin (the full first stage can be found in 
Table A8). The participation equation and hour equation are both estimated with a random 
effects G2SLS model. In all cases except one, the Hausman test indicates a preference for the 
more efficient random effects model.  
To condense information, the table provides only the estimates of interest. The RE 
G2SLS model does not allow producing an F statistics to assess the strength of the instrument 
directly; however, the z statistics for the instrumental variable in the first stage are very strong 
for the second job participation and all hours equations (around 10-11) providing some 
comfort regarding the predictive power of the instrument. Results for the second stage of the 
2SLS suggest that wage shocks have a much bigger impact on the participation decision in a 
second job than previously found in the OLS or FE models. The previously positive effect on 
subsidiary farming, however, disappears in the IV approach. Unfortunately, analyzing the 
effect of wage shocks in regional subsamples reduces the suitability of the instrument as it 
builds on the regional variation of wage shocks. When estimated with G2SLS, the effect on 
working hours becomes much smaller and suggests an increase in second job working time of 
half an hour. However, it must be noted that in contrast to the Tobit model the G2SLS 
estimation does not account for censoring in the hours equations. Coefficients can thus not be 
directly compared. Table A3 reproduces a standard linear fixed-effects estimation of second 
job working hours; its coefficients are the appropriate basis for comparison. The previous 
estimates of 0.2 rose by around 170 to 190 percent when correcting the bias from 
measurement error. In the subsidiary farming hours equation—which suffers only very little 
from censoring—the estimates become more than twice as large after correcting for 
measurement error. A wage shock thus induces an increase of almost 10 hours of working 
time on the land plot. With the exception of the subsidiary farming participation equation all 
instrumental variable estimates confirm the presence of measurement error so that previous 
estimates in the participation and working time decisions were biased towards zero. 
30 Table 8: G2SLS estimates of secondary activities 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Dependent variable  Second job holding 
 
Subsidiary farming 
  RE RE RE RE RE RE 
Wage shock  0.127***  0.123***      -0.028  -0.026 
  (0.046)  (0.046)    (0.146)  (0.164) 
Wage shock intensity      0.032**  0.031**     
     (0.015)  (0.014)    
Log hours main job    -0.012    -0.007    -0.029 
   (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.032) 
Log  non-labor  income   0.006***  0.005***   -0.004 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Hourly wage main job    0.004*    0.003    -0.006 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.010) 
Second job hourly wage    0.001***    0.001**    NA 
   (0.000)  (0.000)    
First stage (Dep. variable: wage shock)         














z-stats  11.16  11.38  4.81 4.85 7.60 6.90 
Female   -0.013  -0.042***  0.007  -0.096  -0.018  -0.067*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.106) (0.107) (0.019) (0.020) 
Age   0.011***  0.014***  -0.004  0.011  0.007  0.011* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.036) (0.036) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age  squared/100  -0.018***  -0.022***  -0.003 -0.020 -0.013  -0.018** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.046) (0.046) (0.009) (0.009) 
Years  of  education  0.002  0.008***  0.013 0.032 0.000 0.006 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.022) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004) 
 -0.082***  -0.546***  -0.106***  Log of working hours 
main  job   (0.017)  (0.141)  (0.024) 
Demographic  controls  X X X X X X 
Wealth  controls  — X — X — X 














R-squared  0.010 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.146 0.147 
Observations  3472 3472 3472 3472 1834 1834 
Note: For full first stage results of (1) and (2) see Table A8. The regressions for the Hausman test were specified 
without time-invariant variables. The smallest critical value is for df(11): 19.7 at the 5% significance level. The 
critical value for df(13): 22.3 at the 5% significance level. Detailed region fixed effects and job characteristics 
are not controlled for, as they are measurement units for the shock instrument. Standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
 
 
31 Table 9: G2SLS estimates of hours in secondary activities 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable  Hours in second job 
 
Hours in subsidiary farming 
 
  RE RE RE RE 
      
Wage  shock  0.551** 0.526** 9.942** 9.445** 
  (0.268) (0.267) (4.156) (4.649) 
Log hours main job    -0.081    -0.185*** 
   (0.057    (0.035) 
Log non-labor income    0.028***    0.085 
   (0.009)  (0.224) 
Hourly wage main job    -0.005    -0.487 
   (0.013)  (0.367) 
Second job hourly shadow wage    0.002     
   (0.002)    
First stage (Dep. variable: wage shock)     
Wage shock risk (sector, region)  0.861*** 0.868*** 1.350*** 1.212*** 
  (0.077) (0.076) (0.134) (0.133) 
z-value of instrument  11.16  11.38  10.11  9.14 
Female   -0.013  -0.042***  0.007  -0.046** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) 
Age   0.011***  0.014***  0.012*  0.016** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age  squared/100  -0.018***  -0.022*** -0.022** -0.025*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Years of education  0.002  0.008***  -0.002  0.005 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Log of working hours main job    -0.082***    -0.002** 
   (0.017)  (0.001) 
Demographic  controls  X X X X 
Wealth  controls  — X — X 
Hausman test, chi2  3.05  11.50  2.71  2.57 
df  13 17 11 15 
R-squared  0.010 0.013 0.106 0.129 
Observations  3472 3472 1352 1352 
Note: Models (1) and (2) treat censored values as uncensored. The sample of models (3) and (4) comprises only 
employees in towns and villages who were engaged in subsidiary farming in both years. For the full first stage 
results see Table A8. Due to smaller sample size in the subsidiary farming model, some variables were removed 
from the model (place dummies, firm ownership). The regressions for the Hausman test were specified without 
time-invariant variables. The smallest critical value is for df(11): 19.7 at the 5% significance level. Detailed 
region fixed effects and job characteristics are not controlled for, as they are measurement units for the shock 
instrument. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
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5.4  Wage Shocks and Quitting Behavior 
If workers were generally risk averse, they would always prefer to work in jobs with 
lower wage uncertainty. Hence, after being affected by wage arrears once, they might be 
inclined to change jobs. As noted by Earle and Sabirianova (2002) the nature of wage arrears 
exerts a bonding effect, as leaving the firm might reduce the probability of being paid the full 
amount of outstanding wages. The resulting trade-off between quitting and staying is an 
empirical question. The availability of second jobs adds a twist to the quitting decision: When 
faced with wage non-payment workers might prefer to search for second jobs first and quit 
the main job as soon the second job can be turned into regular (full time) employment. 
Unfortunately, the data do not permit the exact tracking of each specific employee-employer 
relationship. Yet, this stepping stone hypothesis can be investigated by analyzing differences 
in exit patterns of workers with and without wage shocks and workers who hold a second job 
or not. The overall fraction of job changers between the 2003 and 2004 waves is 8.9 percent. 
As the share of employees who switch job within one year is slightly higher among those who 
currently suffer from wage arrears (10.1 percent), job quitting might dominate the bonding 
effect; however, the difference is quite small.
32 Table 10 estimates the conditional impact of 
current wage arrears on the propensity to change job within one year. The coefficients on 
both, wage shock indicator and wage intensity are positive—but only weakly significant. 
Neither second job holdings themselves, nor the holding of a second job conditional on 
suffering from a wage shock are significantly correlated to a job change in the future. This 
implies that second jobs are not per se used as stepping stones towards new employment by 
employees with risky job remuneration. Still, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
shock intensity and second job holdings (column 4) is highly significant indicating that 
workers with second jobs start leaving their main job as arrears accumulate. 
 
                                                 
32 It should be noted, that involuntary job separation rates are quite low in most transition countries (Brown and 
Earle, 2003). While Lehmann, Pignatti and Wadsworth (2006) find relatively high overall seperation rates for 
Ukraine, the share of involuntary layoffs is again modest. Also, self-employment is still very rare in Ukraine. 
The shares of entrepreneurial activities are higher in urban areas (2.8 percent) than in rural areas (2.4 percent), 
while more persons enter self-employment between 2003 and 2004 in rural areas (2.2 percent) than in urban 
areas (0.7 percent).  
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Table 10: Wage shocks and job change 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Dependent variable  Job change between t and t+1 
 
 Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit 
        
Wage shock in t 0.034*  0.033*     
 (0.022)  (0.23)     
Intensity of wage shocks in t     0.003**  0.001 
     (0.001)  (0.001) 
Second job holding    0.036    0.025 
   (0.047)    (0.042) 
Wage shock/intensity*second job holding    0.099    0.025*** 
   (0.144)    (0.007) 
Demographic controls  X  X  X  X 
Job & wealth controls  X  X  X  X 
Pseudo R-squared  0.158  0.188  0.159  0.189 
Observations 1736  1736  1736  1736 
Note: Marginal fixed effects reported. The interaction term in column (2) is with wage shock, the one in column 
(4) with wage shock intensity. The estimation adopts a forward looking linear probability model. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
 
 
5.5  Consumption Smoothing 
The smoothing model (equation 4) tests whether households whose members suffer 
from a wage shock (at least one household member) consume less and whether they 
successfully use secondary activities in order to smooth out these shortfalls (Table 11). The 
coefficients on income indicate that consumption is co-moving with income, however, only 
partially. The fact that the estimates are statistically different from zero but smaller than one 
implies that consumption is positively related to current income but far from being perfectly 
insurable against income fluctuations. Wage shocks within the household induce on average a 
3 percent shortfall in household consumption, while second jobs per se do not significantly 
affect consumption levels. As our outcome variable measures the log of total household 
consumption, the fixed effect regressions also account for household size. Column (2) adds an 
interaction term of wage arrear incidence with second job holdings. The coefficient thus 
measures how consumption levels are affected in households that make use of second job 
holdings in order to cope with wage shocks. The table shows a highly significant positive 
coefficient; however, to study the effect of interest, the relevant measure is the joint 
coefficient of δ2 + δ3 + δ4, which is reported at the bottom of the table. The hypothesis (H0) 
under consideration is that households coping with second jobs cannot smooth out 
consumption shortfalls from wage shocks, so δ2 + δ3 + δ4 < 0.  Table 11: Secondary activities as household consumption smoothing mechanisms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Full sample  Full sample  Rural sample  Urban sample  Full sample  Rural sample  Urban sample  Full sample 
Dependent variable  Log of household consumption 
  FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Log  of  income  0.121*** 0.120*** 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Wage arrear in HH (δ2) -0.029**  -0.040** -0.034  -0.045 -0.054** -0.053*  -0.044 -0.059*** 
  (0.012) (0.020) (0.024) (0.040) (0.022) (0.027) (0.040) (0.022) 
Second job in HH (δ3) -0.024  -0.045**  -0.049  -0.033        -0.047** 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.033) (0.031)        (0.023) 
Arrear*Second job (δ4)   0.099**  0.089  0.132*       0.102** 
   (0.043)  (0.056)  (0.068)      (0.043) 
     0.049**  0.055*  0.043  0.052**  Arrear*Increase in sub-
sidiary farming hours (δ5)       (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.047)  (0.025) 
Access to credit    0.418  1.516*  -3.196  0.428  1.512*  -3.209  0.445 
    (0.485) (0.817) (2.327) (0.485) (0.817) (2.330) (0.485) 
Arrear*Access credit     0.046  -0.098  0.075  0.078  -0.099  0.070  0.035 
    (0.234) (0.323) (0.384) (0.233) (0.318) (0.385) (0.234) 
Town   0.102**  0.158***   0.106**  0.159***   0.106** 
   (0.044)  (0.056)  (0.044)  (0.056)  (0.044) 
Large  city   0.134***    0.139***    0.139*** 
   (0.046)    (0.046)    (0.046) 
Household  size  0.082*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Constant  5.423*** 5.320*** 5.243*** 5.746*** 5.320*** 5.247*** 5.742*** 5.319*** 
  (0.047) (0.063) (0.086) (0.189) (0.063) (0.086) (0.189) (0.063) 
(2)-(4): δ2 + δ3 + δ4 
(5)-(7): δ2 + δ3 + δ5 















Hausman test, chi2  74.00  117.79  51.87  38.24  90.05  86.46  19.75  109.38 
R-squared  0.219 0.224 0.235 0.212 0.223 0.235 0.209 0.226 
Observations  4270 4270 2222 1886 4270 2222 1886 4270 
Note: Highest critical value for models (2) and (8) with df(10): 18.3 at the 5% significance level. All Hausman tests rejected at the 1% level. Omitted category: Settlement village. 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
35 Although δ2 + δ3 + δ4 are jointly positive, they are not statistically significant different 
from zero. In other words, household suffering from a wage shock and using second jobs to 
cope with them are no worse off than households without any wage shock. Column 2 also 
accounts for access to the credit market which might be considered a tool for consumption 
smoothing in developed economies. As expected in a setting of credit constraints, the 
financial market plays no significant role in consumption determination and is not used as a 
consumption smoothing tool. Columns 3 and 4 show results after splitting the sample into 
rural and urban households. While second jobs seem to be a significant coping strategy for 
urban households, they are marginally insignificant in rural areas. Overall, the joint coping 
term is positive for rural areas and negative for urban areas, but the large standard errors leave 
the effects insignificant. Rural households might use other coping strategies which buffer 
their consumption levels against unforeseen shortfalls, like subsidiary farming. In columns 5 
to 7, an interaction term between the incidence of current wage shocks and a dummy 
indicating an increase of subsidiary farming hours is added to the model. This is done as the 
previous analysis suggested more pronounced reactions at the intensive rather than extensive 
margin of subsidiary farming. Indeed, rural households can significantly improve their 
welfare situation by extending their farming activities, while this option seems less helpful fur 
urban residents. The overall results suggest that farming is a successful coping strategy for 
consumption smoothing in rural areas while second jobs are better suitable for urban areas. 
Rural labor markets with their low dynamics seem incapable of absorbing transitory excess 
labor supply. Column 8 includes both coping strategies at the same time into the consumption 
smoothing model. All previous results remain robust. 
In order to test the sensitivity of the results with respect to household size, Table A9 in 
the Appendix replicates all results with adult equivalence scales. Such scales account for 
economies of scales in household consumption. Oxford equivalence scales assign the 
consumption weight of one to the first adult, 0.7 to all additional adults and 0.5 to all children 
(aged up to 15) in the household. Applying this consumption correction does not change any 
of the previous results.  
 
6   Robustness and Alternative Hypotheses 
The following section evaluates potential alternative hypotheses which might explain 
the observed labor supply patterns and hence pose a threat to the validity of the identified 
results. In detail, the following section shows that the labor supply response in coping 
36 activities cannot be explained by constrained working hours or by anticipatory ex-ante 
coping. 
 
6.1  Constrained Working Hours Hypothesis 
One alternative explanation for the observed pattern of secondary activities refers to 
the initial idea of second job holding models. The early literature analyzed second job 
holdings in the USA, focusing mainly on constraints in working hours. These early model 
applications were not associated with the consumption smoothing motive. Is it then possible 
that second job holdings were merely driven by hours constraints? Some facts point into this 
direction: Employees in Ukraine face a limited choice set of working hours. The Ukrainian 
Labor Code stemming from the 1970s is restrictive with respect to contractual flexibility and 
prescribes a weekly working time of 40 hours. Consequently, almost all employees are 
contracted for exactly 40 hours. More flexible job contracts are starting to emerge slowly. 
Only 4.4 percent of employees usually work less than full time.
33 In our context, problems 
would arise if enterprises that imposed wage arrears on their employees were at the same time 
reducing labor demand. This might be plausible if wage arrears reflected negative demand 
shocks to firms causing a simultaneous reduction of production and labor costs. In the 
reference week, less than 1.6 percent of all employees report that they have worked fewer 
than usual hours because they were either involuntarily sent home, because of work schedule 
or because demand or input supply was too low. However, to check whether these groups of 
workers might be more likely to take on a second job, the participation and hours regressions 
are re-run with interactions of the wage arrear indicator and two dummies, one indicating that 
a person is working fewer hours for demand reasons, the other one indicating involuntary 
leaves from work (Table 12). Neither the variable indicating low demand nor the interaction 
term has any impact on second job holdings. The compulsory leave dummy shows a positive 
sign in the working hours model, suggesting that workers from firms that sent (part of) their 
workforce home work on average two hours more in a second job. Less clear is the picture for 
                                                 
33 Additional 9.8 percent of employees report less than 40 hours work per week, but claim to be considered full-
time workers as their contractual work load is lower than 40 hours. This applies in specific, often hazardous, 
occupations, for night work and for employees aged up to 18 years. The latter group, however, is excluded from 
the sample. As a robustness check, regressions for part-time and full-time subsamples are run separately. Part-
time employment is defined as having worked at most 35 hours per week in 2003. The results are qualitatively 
the same, with part-time workers being slightly more likely to hold a second job (albeit with imprecise point 
estimate owing to the small part-time sample). Part- and full-time workers show a similar response to wage 
arrears (Table A10). This is not surprising, given that main job working hours are controlled for in the standard 
analysis. 
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subsidiary farming: While low labor demand plays no role for the amount of hours supplied 
on land plots, general participation in farming is higher among employees in firms with low 
demand but no wage shocks.
34 To further investigate the hypothesis of constrained working 
hours, contractual and actual hours of work are compared instead of self-reported absence 
from work. When interacting the wage shock indicator with a dummy variable that takes on 
the value of one if an employee simultaneously works less than contractual and suffers from a 
wage arrear (and zero otherwise) the previous results are robust. A final check uses 
information on desired working hours among those who were reporting less than forty hours 
in the reference week.
35 If under normal circumstances time constraints limited these 
employees, one would expect them to respond with a desired labor supply of more than forty 
hours. However, 91 percent of those working less than forty hours in the reference week 
would like to work up to forty hours only. Among those suffering from wage arrears, the 
share of those wanting to work more than 40 hours is even lower (6.7 percent) and this group 
is no more likely to hold a second job. Reduced working time alone cannot explain the switch 
towards second job holdings. This leads to the conclusion that wage shocks have a negative 
impact on main job hours through the shift towards second job holdings, not vice versa. 
Employees thus substitute away effort from the risky main job towards the second job.   
 
6.2  Anticipation of Wage Shocks 
If wage shocks are more likely to appear in some firms or sectors than in others, 
workers might observe these differences and sort into sectors or firms according to their risk 
aversion. However, workers employed in at-risk jobs or occupations should be aware of the 
risk they face and, hence, ex-ante respond to their potential wage shortfalls with precautionary 
behavior (cp. Low et al., 2010). In that case, the measured labor supply effect might reflect 
the anticipatory behavior of at-risk workers rather than ex-post coping strategies. To test the 
anticipation hypothesis a model is estimated whether workers who will suffer from shocks in 
period t+1 already adapt their labor supply in period t. The coefficients of the forward looking 
regressions are shown in Table 13. 
 
34 There are too few observations for involuntary leaves in towns, so that columns (3) and (6) are not replicated 
for subsidiary farming jobs. 
35 The question on desired working hours is only asked to individuals who work fewer than 40 hours in the 
reference week.  
Table 12: Response to wage shocks in firms with low labor demand or involuntary leaves 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Dependent variables  Second job holding  Hrs. in second job  Subsidiary farming  Hrs. in subsid. farming 
  FE  FE  FE  RE Tobit  RE Tobit  RE Tobit  FE  FE  RE Tobit  RE Tobit 
            
Wage  shock  0.028** 0.026** 0.029**  4.758***  2.639** 3.910*** 0.128**  0.154**  2.391**  2.340* 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (1.788) (1.195) (1.432) (0.064) (0.063) (1.048) (1.248) 
Low labor demand    -0.005      -1.456      0.371**    4.933 
   (0.028)    (3.681)    (0.155)  (5.336) 
 0.108    6.971     -0.494*   -0.695  Wage shock*Low labor 
demand   (0.066)    (5.593)    (0.255)   (10.602) 
Involuntary  leave     -0.017    1.884*        
     (0.172)    (1.015)        
   0.010    -5.094         Wage shock*Involuntary 
leave     (0.199)    (180.9)        
Demographic  controls  X X X X X X X X X X 
Job & wealth controls  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Rho  0.530 0.523 0.529 0.683 0.271 0.110 0.631 0.620 0.387 0.384 
LL  3630.9 3630.5 3627.8 -547.9 -598.6 -587.7  134.6  131.8  -6209  -6208 
R-squared  /  Chi  2  0.015 0.015 0.016 24.33 32.63 33.76 0.115 0.110 1615  1298 
Observations  3472 3472 3472 3472 3472 3472  874  874  1834 1834 
  Note: The sample for subsidiary farming comprises individuals residing in towns, while sample for hours in subsidiary farming comprise individuals residing in towns or 
villages. Involuntary leaves were quite rare, so that the estimation of model (3) and (6) was not repeated for subsidiary farming. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, 










None of the anticipation coefficients on future wage shocks carries a significant 
positive sign, implying that precautionary behavior is absent. Column 6 shows a 
negative anticipation effect on subsidiary farming hours; this counter-intuitive result is 
only significant at the 10 percent level and might reflect a type I error. These general 
results are in line with the presumption that the incidence of wage shocks has a random 
component. Consequently, non-anticipation of shocks supports the choice of a 
framework with myopically behaving agents.  
 
A related explanation for the detected shock response pattern could be associated 
with past shock experience. The more distant experience of wage shocks is picked up by 
the individual fixed effects as a ‘common history’. Furthermore, having suffered from 
wage shocks during the 1990s should not have any impact on today’s precautionary 
behavior as wage shocks then were virtually omnipresent in Ukraine. More recent wage 
shocks could, however, make the difference: In order to test this hypothesis, a variable 
indicating the incidence of a wage shock 9 to 12 months ago is included in the models 
alongside the current wage shock dummy. If recent past wage shocks promoted 
precautionary second job holdings, this variable should pick up part of the estimated 
coping effect from the current shock. As can be seen from Table 14, the estimates of 
labor supply responses to wage shocks are almost identical to previous results after 
controlling for previous shock experience. At the same time, the coefficient of past 
shock experience is insignificant. This finding further underlines the fact that second 
jobs are used as immediate coping mechanisms in response to wage shocks.  
In sum, the pattern of secondary activities cannot be explained by the rivaling 
hypotheses about hours constraints and precautionary coping behavior. In an online 
appendix to this paper, further robustness tests provide evidence that the estimated 




 Table 13: Anticipation of wage shocks 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Strict anticipation  Broad anticipation  Strict anticipation  Broad anticipation 
Dependent variable  Second job 
in t 
Hrs. in 2nd 
job in t 
Second job 
in t 
Hrs. in 2nd 
job in t 
Subsidiary 
farming in t 
Hrs. in sub. 
farm. in t 
Subsidiary 
farming in t 
Hrs. in sub. 
farm. in t 
Wage shock in t+1  0.002 0.017 0.006 0.142 -0.145  -3.598*  -0.039 0.559 
  (0.017) (0.086) (0.011) (0.136) (0.111) (1.986) (0.069) (1.515) 
Log hours main job  -0.008  -0.064  -0.009  -0.090  -0.016  -0.202***  0.001  -0.192*** 
  (0.014) (0.060) (0.012) (0.080) (0.079) (0.056) (0.057) (0.047) 
Demographic,  job  &  welfare  controls  X X X X X X X X 
R-squared  0.024 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.132 0.167 0.129 0.189 
Observations  1518 1518 1736 1736  377  775  437  917 
Note: Strict anticipation includes only person who do not suffer from current wage shocks. Broad anticipation includes entire sample. Sample for subsidiary farming comprises 
individuals residing in towns, while sample for hours in subsidiary farming comprise individuals residing in towns or villages. The estimation adopts a linear probability model. 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations.  
 
 
Table 14: Effects of wage shocks when controlling for recent shock experience 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable  Second job holding  Hrs. in second job  Subsidiary farming  Hrs. in subsidiary farming 
  FE  FE  RE Tobit  RE Tobit  FE  FE  RE Tobit  RE Tobit 
Wage  shock  0.031** 0.029** 4.718** 4.688** 0.131**  0.118* 4.217***  2.707** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (1.984) (2.037) (0.062) (0.067) (1.277) (1.210) 
-0.015 -0.014 0.696 0.680 -0.022 -0.036 -0.244 -0.290  Past wage shock (9 to 12 months ago) 
(0.024) (0.024) (3.420) (3.338) (0.116) (0.119) (0.297) (0.221) 
Demographic  controls  X X X X X X X X 
Job  &  welfare  controls  — X — X — X — X 
Rho  0.522 0.534 0.669 0.711 0.615 0.756 0.390 0.389 
LL 3611  3643  -552.6  -532.0  96.66  110.5  -6223  -6208 
R-squared / Chi2  0.004  0.023  20.3  35.3  0.035  0.065  923.5  982.4 
Observations  3472 3472 3472 3472  874  874  1834 1834 
Note: Sample for subsidiary farming comprises individuals residing in towns, while sample for hours in subsidiary farming comprise individuals residing in towns or villages. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
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7  Conclusions 
This paper tested whether individuals use secondary activities as consumption 
smoothing devices against transitory wage shocks, in a setting of myopic and credit 
constrained agents. The empirical analysis is based on a unique panel data set from Ukraine 
which provides detailed information on employment relations, wages and wage non-payment. 
The results suggest a significantly positive albeit small effect of the incidence of wage shocks 
and shock intensity on second job holdings and a sizeable effect on subsidiary farming in 
areas with access to land plots. Working hours are increased in second jobs and subsidiary 
farming by 3 to 5 hours while main job hours and leisure time are reduced in a similar order 
of magnitude. Exogenous repayment of outstanding wages is used as a supportive quasi-
experiment to test the coherence of the temporary coping hypothesis. The data reject several 
alternative explanations for the observed activity choices, like hours constraints in the main 
job and the anticipation of shocks.  
These findings prove robust when accounting for unobserved heterogeneity of 
employees by controlling for fixed effects. Most estimates become quantitatively larger after 
correcting potential measurement error in the shock variable with an instrumental variable 
approach. 
To test the effectiveness of the coping behavior a simple econometric test of 
household consumption smoothing is carried out. It reveals that non-anticipated transitory 
wage shocks cannot be perfectly insured ex-ante. However, households whose members cope 
with wage shocks by re-allocating work effort from main to secondary job manage to keep up 
their consumption levels. Hence, secondary activities enable households to fully smooth out 
income shortfalls from wage arrears. The results are in line with the general consumption 
smoothing literature which suggests that individuals and households put coping mechanisms 
in place when insurance and foresight are imperfect. The presented evidence is thus consistent 
with the prediction from the static theory of labor supply.  
The findings from this research have several interesting policy implications. First, in 
the absence of protective social security institutions individuals strive to engage in secondary 
activities as coping mechanisms in order to reduce the consequences of wage shocks. This 
evidence indicates that individuals and households might manage to feed themselves; 
however, politics that rely on this mechanism must keep in mind how limited the scope for 
self-help might be, e.g. through low demand on the second job market or weather risks. 
42 Second, the paper has shown how firms’ wage payments may lead to diversification on the 
labor market and thus spill-over from firm policies on labor supply. The results suggest that 
employees do not entirely retreat from the labor market but on average reduce main 
employment effort in substitution for secondary activities. Potentially these jobs may be less 
productive or informal implying negative consequences for tax revenues. Third, the 
reallocation of work may impact on the regional labor supply, as wage shocks were found to 
be regionally highly concentrated. The previous research on wage arrears in transition 
countries has regarded the clustering of wage risks in combination with low job mobility as 
the main reason why employees refrain from switching employers after shocks. This paper 
delivers another aspect which has been ignored in the literature so far: If coping mechanisms 
for consumption smoothing were widely available in the short run, workers might feel less 
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table A1: Overview of variables  
 
Variable Mean  Min  Max 
 
Labor market information     
Second job  2.3%  0  1 
Hours second job h2 0.12  0  24 
Conditional hours in second job, (h2 | h2 > 0) 5.1  0.5  24 
Subsidiary farming  61.5%  0  1 
Hours subsidiary farming h2 9.5  0  98 
Conditional hours in subsidiary farming, (h2 | h2 > 0) 14.6  0  98 
Hours in main job (reference week)  40.9  1  100 
Leisure time (hours per week)  62.3  12  109 
Wage shock Prob(γ > 0) (arrear)  10.6%  0  1 
Intensity of shock γ (number of arrear months)  0.30  0  69 
Conditional intensity of shock γ, (γ | γ > 0)   5.2  0.1  69 
Repayment 0.14  0  1 
Effort related positive shock  1.2%  0  1 
 
Demographic characteristics     
Female 54.9%  0  1 
Married 71.9%  0  1 
Age 40.6  17  60 
Adjusted years of schooling  12.0  4  15 
 
Regional characteristics 
Village  27.4% 0  1 
Town 27.4%  0  1 
City 45.2%  0  1 
Kiev (region)  5.5%  0  1 
West (region)  18.7%  0  1 
East (region)  27.2%  0  1 
South (region)  24.9%  0  1 
Centre (region)  23.7%  0  1 
 
Welfare indicators     
Asset indicator  0.3  -3.398  4.346 
Log of non-labor income  5.5  0  9.1 
 
Job characteristics 
Contractual hourly wage in main job  2.2 0.1 45 
Economic sector    1  12 
Business ownership category    1  4 
Note: Sample size: 3,472 (balanced sample). Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
 Table A2: Correlation matrix for asset items and asset indicator 










Color TV  1 
  
PC 0.1338  1
 0.000 
Phone 0.2362  0.1877 1
 0.000  0.000
Mobile phone 0.1636 0.2821 0.1462 1
 0.000  0.000 0.000
Refrigerator 0.3892 0.1004 0.2316 0.1287 1
 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000
Washing  machine 0.3108 0.1237 0.2022 0.1389 0.3281 1
 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Car  0.1828 0.1398 0.191 0.2116 0.1596 0.1949 1
 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Motorcycle 0.0625 -0.0387 -0.0298 -0.0139 0.0344 0.0573 0.0248 1
 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.002
Dacha  0.0907 0.0755 0.1399 0.0639 0.0891 0.0881 0.1111 0.0114 1
 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.154
Other apartment,  house  0.0177 0.0273 0.0132 0.0608 0.0084 0.0282 0.0291 0.0349 0.0769 1
 0.027  0.001 0.097 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Score for component  1 0.6491 0.4401 0.5609 0.4777 0.6254 0.6078 0.5038 0.0592 0.2966 0.0996 
 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Reported values are factor predictions from Principal Component analysis. Sample size: 3,472 (balanced sample). The table displays pair wise correlation coefficients; 















Table A3: Hours responses to wage shocks, intensive margin 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Dependent variable  Hours in second job 
  FE FE FE FE FE FE 
        
Wage shock  0.206**      0.182*     
  (0.093)    (0.094)    
Intensity of wage shock    0.082***      0.080***   
   (0.011)    (0.011)  
Repayment       -1.505***     -1.474***
     (0.553)      (0.557) 
Log hours main job  -0.169**  -0.170**  -0.182**  -0.222**  -0.231**  -0.245** 
  (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.100) (0.098) (0.100) 
        
Demographic  controls  X X X X X X 
Job & wealth controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
R-squared  0.007 0.034 0.008 0.017 0.043 0.019 
Observations  3472 3472 3472 3472 3472 3472 
Note: Regressions for illustration only. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
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Table A4: Full list of main regressors, extensive margin, OLS model 
Comparison of maximal sample (col. 1 to 8) with constant sample size (col. 9 and 10)  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 
Dependent variable  Second job holding indicator (0/1) 
  Maximal sample  Maximal sample  Constant sample 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS 
Wage  arrear  0.021**      0.023**      0.023**  0.024** 
 (0.010)        (0.010)        (0.011)  (0.011) 
Number of arrears    0.004        0.004         
   (0.003)        (0.003)         
Repayment       -0.026***        -0.028***       
     (0.008)        (0.009)       
Positive  shock       0.032      0.031    
       (0.033)        (0.035)     
Female    0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003  0.002 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Age  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001  0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Age  squared/100  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002  -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
0.001*  0.001*  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001*  0.001  Second job hourly shadow 
wage  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Log hours main job  -0.027***  -0.026**  -0.027***  -0.027***  -0.021*  -0.021*  -0.023*  -0.024**  -0.021*  -0.020 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.013) 
Village    -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.008  -0.005 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.008) 




   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.007) 
Married           -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.009    -0.010 
         (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.007) 
Asset indicator          0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002    0.001 
         (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002) 
     0.005***  0.005***  0.006***  0.006***    0.006***  Log of non labor income 
     (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001) 
Hourly wage main job          0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002    0.001 
         (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002) 
Kiev 0.004  0.003  0.002  0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  0.014  0.008 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)  (0.015) 
West 0.021**  0.021**  0.020**  0.020**  0.024***  0.024***  0.023***  0.023***  0.033***  0.030*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.010) 
East  0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.010  0.007 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) 
South  0.019** 0.019** 0.018** 0.018** 0.020** 0.020** 0.019** 0.019**  0.025***  0.023** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Time   0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  0.005  0.005 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) 
Constant 0.025  0.021  0.027  0.026  -0.040  -0.043  -0.033  -0.032  0.014  -0.041 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065)  (0.072) 
Sector  and  job  characteristics  — — — — X  X  X  X  — X 
R-squared  0.015 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.022 0.024 0.020 0.020 0.016  0.020 
Observations  4282 4282 4282 4282 4022 4022 4022 4022 3472  3472 





Table A5a: Full list of main regressors, extensive margin second job holdings, FE model   
Comparison of maximal sample (col. 1 to 8) with constant sample size (col. 9 and 10)  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 
Dependent variable  Second job holding indicator (0/1) 
  Maximal sample  Maximal sample  Constant sample 
  FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE  FE 
Wage  arrear  0.027**      0.027**      0.028**  0.027** 
  (0.011)      (0.013)      (0.013)  (0.013) 
Number  of  arrears   0.006***      0.006***        
   (0.001)      (0.002)        
Repayment       -0.170**      -0.195**      
     (0.068)      (0.077)      
Positive  shock      -0.023      -0.025     
      (0.026)      (0.028)     
Age  -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.012 -0.015 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012  -0.012 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)  (0.023) 
Age  squared/100  0.008 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.013  0.011 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)  (0.020) 
Years  of  education  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  -0.000  Second job hourly shadow 
wage  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Log hours main job  -0.022**  -0.023**  -0.024**  -0.024**  -0.020  -0.022  -0.023*  -0.023  -0.026**  -0.020 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.014) 
Town    -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012  -0.010 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)  (0.020) 
Time    0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007  0.008 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.014) 




          (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)    (0.015) 
Asset  indicator       -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003    -0.003 
       (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.004) 
Log  of  non  labor  income       0.005**  0.005**  0.005**  0.005**    0.005** 
       (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002) 
Hourly wage rate main job          0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001    0.002 
       (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.003) 
Constant  0.228 0.260 0.237 0.246 0.295 0.385 0.334 0.335 0.390  0.332 
  (0.329) (0.328) (0.329) (0.330) (0.641) (0.640) (0.639) (0.640) (0.639)  (0.665) 
Sector and job characteristics  —  —  —  —  X  X  X  X  —  X 
R-squared  0.007 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.022 0.028 0.024 0.020 0.007  0.023 
Observations  4282 4282 4282 4282 4022 4022 4022 4022 3472  3472 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by id; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
 
 
Table A5b: Full list of main regressors, extensive margin, subsidiary farming, FE model   
Comparison of maximal sample (col. 1 to 8) with constant sample size (col. 9 and 10)  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 
Dependent variable  Subsidiary farming indicator (0/1) 
  Maximal sample  Maximal sample  Constant sample 
  FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE  FE 
Wage  arrear  0.131**      0.106*      0.158***  0.128** 
  (0.057)      (0.063)      (0.060)  (0.064) 
Number  of  arrears    0.003      0.003       
   (0.006)      (0.006)        
Repayment       -0.070      -0.253      
     (0.314)      (0.338)      
Positive  shock      0.037      0.071     








Age  -0.036 -0.043 -0.039 -0.040 0.026  0.020  0.028  0.025  0.038 0.022 
  (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112)  (0.115) 
Age  squared/100  0.042 0.048 0.044 0.045 -0.025  -0.020  -0.028  -0.025  -0.040  -0.022 
  (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103)  (0.106) 
Years  of  education  0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.002  0.002 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.014) 
Log  hours  main  job  -0.008 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.005 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 0.023 0.006 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.053)  (0.060) 
Time    -0.156 -0.142 -0.142 -0.142 -0.053 -0.039 -0.041 -0.039 -0.074  -0.060 
  (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.109)  (0.113) 
Married         -0.001  0.005  0.003  0.004    -0.006 
         (0.079)  (0.080)  (0.079)  (0.079)    (0.081) 
Asset  indicator       -0.019  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017    -0.017 
       (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)    (0.017) 
Log  of  non  labor  income       0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000    -0.001 
       (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)    (0.012) 
Hourly wage rate main job          -0.021  -0.027*  -0.026*  -0.027*    -0.020 
       (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.014) 
Interview  month:  June  0.123 0.103 0.102 0.102 0.022 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.027  0.009 
  (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.100)  (0.104) 
Interview  month:  July  0.141 0.120 0.118 0.119 0.038 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.042  0.031 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.111)  (0.115) 
Interview  month:  August  0.554***  0.478** 0.476** 0.476**  0.334  0.280  0.274  0.271  0.362*  0.329 
  (0.204) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.227) (0.225) (0.224) (0.224) (0.219)  (0.239) 
Interview  month:  September  -0.166  -0.192  -0.192  -0.193  -0.381** -0.402** -0.405** -0.407** -0.372**  -0.402** 
  (0.143) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.160)  (0.165) 
Constant  0.228 0.260 0.237 0.246 0.295 0.385 0.334 0.335 0.390  0.332 
  (0.329) (0.328) (0.329) (0.330) (0.641) (0.640) (0.639) (0.640) (0.639)  (0.665) 
Sector and job characteristics  —  —  —  —  X  X  X  X  —  X 
R-squared  0.083 0.074 0.073 0.073 0.111 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.088  0.117 
Observations  1036  1036  1036  1036  983 983 983 983 874  874 
Note: The sample comprises only individuals residing in towns. The omitted interview month is May. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by id; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations.     Table A6: Full list of main regressors, intensive margin 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable  Hours in second job  Hours in subsidiary farming 
  Tobit  Tobit  RE Tobit  RE Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  RE Tobit  RE Tobit 
Wage shock  4.924***  4.758***  4.870***  5.094***  4.661*** 2.878** 3.932*** 2.293** 
  (1.779) (1.788) (1.862) (1.909) (1.161) (1.215) (1.183) (1.112) 
Hours main job  -0.098*  -0.104*  -0.128**  -0.124*  -0.200***  -0.231***  -0.212***  -0.240*** 
  (0.057) (0.060) (0.061) (0.064) (0.035) (0.037) (0.042) (0.047) 
Second job shadow hr. wage  0.166** 0.159** 0.183**  0.170*         
 (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.087)  (0.087)         
Female   0.800  0.308  0.422  0.086  2.525***  3.038***  2.424***  3.035** 
  (1.288) (1.338) (1.512) (1.636) (0.803) (0.888) (0.894) (1.206) 
Age   0.168  0.518  0.068  0.364  1.667***  1.246***  1.639***  1.225*** 
  (0.455) (0.469) (0.531) (0.549) (0.301) (0.309) (0.360) (0.395) 
Age squared/100  -0.315  -0.714  -0.192  -0.551  -1.719***  -1.283***  -1.676***  -1.250** 
  (0.572) (0.585) (0.667) (0.685) (0.376) (0.384) (0.452) (0.495) 
Years of education  0.873***  0.789**  0.682*  0.628*  -0.173  -0.019  -0.186  -0.050 
  (0.323) (0.331) (0.356) (0.370) (0.193) (0.202) (0.169) (0.174) 
Village   -0.729  0.038  -1.132  -1.650  10.166*** 8.737*** 10.258*** 8.873*** 
  (1.792) (1.826) (2.121) (2.311) (0.816) (0.835) (0.868) (1.161) 
Town   0.722  1.112  0.543  0.453         
 (1.507)  (1.528)  (1.750)  (1.796)         
Kiev 4.813  3.386  4.619  2.555         
 (3.221)  (3.164)  (3.765)  (3.779)         
West 7.488***  6.720***  7.454***  7.154***  -1.995*  -1.351  -2.019  -1.347 
  (2.237) (2.208) (2.584) (2.592) (1.067) (1.065) (1.234) (1.262) 
East 4.023*  3.164  4.063  3.398  -5.651***  -4.745***  -5.605***  -4.795*** 
  (2.308) (2.288) (2.645) (2.655) (1.078) (1.107) (1.226) (0.904) 
South 7.351***  6.407***  7.055**  6.253**  -4.132***  -3.989***  -4.404***  -4.245*** 
  (2.470) (2.442) (2.835) (2.824) (1.115) (1.112) (1.305) (1.273) 
56 57 
Time    0.897 0.837 1.138 0.861 1.319 1.589 -0.085 0.316 
  (1.219) (1.247) (1.045) (1.062) (1.953) (1.947) (1.897) (2.091) 
Married     -2.198    -1.741    5.413***    5.151*** 
   (1.452)  (1.617)  (1.005)  (1.124) 
Asset  indicator   -0.060  -0.256   -0.535*   -0.497 
   (0.511)  (0.551)  (0.307)  (0.339) 
Log non-labor income    2.404***    2.505***    -0.063    -0.043 
   (0.679)  (0.688)  (0.238)  (0.246) 
Hourly wage main job    0.010    -0.018    -0.632**    -0.587 
   (0.385)  (0.400)  (0.299)  (0.396) 
Job  controls  X X X X X X X X 
Interview month controls  —  —  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Rho     0.683  0.719      0.388  0.374 
LL -572.3  -559.5  -547.9  -532.3  -6287  -6256  -6224  -6198 
Pseudo R-squared / Chi2  0.039  0.060  24.33  34.09  0.0319  0.0367  359.6  1161 
Observations  3472 3472 3472 3472 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Note: Omitted categories: Region ‘Centre’, settlement type ‘large city’; Job characteristics include economic sector, firm ownership type. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations.         
 
 
Table A7: Shock response patterns in second jobs by geographic location 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
 
 Town  & 
Village 
City  Town & Village  City  Town & Village  City 
 
 
Dependent variables  Second job  Log hours main job  Log leisure 
  RE  RE FE  FE RE  RE 
Wage shock  0.025**  0.034**  -0.066**  -0.038  -0.045*  -0.013 
  (0.011)  (0.016) (0.033)  (0.047) (0.025)  (0.021) 
Log non-labor income  0.005**  0.009***  -0.002  -0.004  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.005)  (0.003) 
Hourly wage main job  -0.001  0.003      0.034***  0.021*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.006)  (0.003) 
Rho 0.236  0.377  0.627  0.516  0.211  0.290 
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.034  0.048  0.026  0.033  0.189  0.108 
Observations  1904  1568 1904  1568 1904  1568 






 Table A8: First stage of G2SLS model 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Dependent variable:  Wage shock indicator (0/1) 
Wage shock instrument (UHBS)  0.874*** 0.868*** 1.350*** 1.212*** 
  (0.077) (0.076) (0.134) (0.133) 
Female   -0.013  -0.042***  0.007  -0.046** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) 
Age   0.011***  0.014***  0.012*  0.016** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age  squared/100  -0.018***  -0.022*** -0.022** -0.025*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Years of education  0.002  0.008***  -0.002  0.005 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Kiev -0.006  -0.003  NA  NA 
 (0.026)  (0.026)     
West -0.015  -0.019  NA  NA 
 (0.016)  (0.016)     
East  0.009 0.004 -0.012 0.002 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) 
South -0.012  -0.030*  -0.020  -0.014 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) 
Village   0.079***  0.037** 0.060*** 0.038** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) 
Town   0.036***  0.018  NA  NA 
 (0.013)  (0.013)     
Time    -0.038*** -0.021** -0.134*** -0.101** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.047) (0.047) 
Log of working hours main job    -0.082***    -0.002** 
   (0.017)  (0.001) 
Second job hourly wage    -0.002***    NA 
   (0.001)    
Log of non-labor income    -0.003    0.003 
   (0.003)  (0.005) 
Hourly wage main job    -0.032***    -0.049*** 
   (0.003)  (0.006) 
Asset  indicator   -0.008*  -0.012* 
   (0.004)  (0.007) 
Interview month May      -0.009  -0.006 
     (0.027)  (0.027) 
Interview month June      0.044  0.034 
     (0.050)  (0.049) 
Interview month July      0.088  0.088* 
     (0.053)  (0.052) 
Interview month August      -0.031  -0.020 
     (0.086)  (0.084) 
Constant  -0.091 0.158 -0.099 -0.063 
  (0.098) (0.104) (0.146) (0.152) 
Wald chi(df)  255 389 152 228 
df  13 17 14 17 
Prob  >  chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations  3472 3472 1352 1352 
Note: Omitted categories: ‘Central region’, ‘city’, ‘Interview month September’. Detailed region fixed 
effects and job characteristics are not controlled for, as they are measurement units for the shock 
instrument. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own 
calculations.  
59 Table A9: Consumption smoothing model with adult equivalence scales 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Full sample Full sample  Rural sample  Urban sample  Full sample  Rural sample  Urban sample  Full sample 
Dependent variable  Log of household consumption 
  FE  FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Log  of  income  0.130***  0.128*** 0.129*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
Wage arrear in HH (δ2) -0.025**  -0.037* -0.030  -0.050  -0.051**  -0.047* -0.047  -0.055** 
  (0.012)  (0.021) (0.025) (0.041) (0.023) (0.028) (0.041) (0.023) 
Second job in HH (δ3)  -0.011  -0.033 -0.036 -0.023        -0.034 
  (0.022)  (0.024) (0.035) (0.032)        (0.024) 
Arrear*Second job (δ4)    0.102** 0.078 0.155**        0.106** 
    (0.044) (0.058) (0.070)        (0.044) 
      0.050*  0.050  0.051  0.052**  Arrear*Increase in sub-
sidiary farming hours (δ5)        (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.048)  (0.025) 
Access to credit    0.409  1.318  -2.226  0.425  1.320  -2.250  0.436 
    (0.502) (0.850) (2.378) (0.502) (0.850) (2.381) (0.502) 
Arrear*Access  credit      0.056 -0.071 0.124 0.094 -0.065 0.109 0.045 
    (0.242) (0.336) (0.393) (0.241) (0.331) (0.394) (0.242) 
Town    0.100** 0.148**    0.104** 0.149**    0.103** 
    (0.045) (0.058)    (0.045) (0.058)    (0.045) 
Large  city    0.131***    0.136***    0.136*** 
    (0.047)    (0.047)    (0.047) 
Household  size  0.082***  0.082*** 0.086*** 0.077*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.077*** 0.082*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) 
Constant  5.477***  5.377*** 5.331*** 5.698*** 5.374*** 5.330*** 5.693*** 5.375*** 
  (0.052)  (0.068) (0.093) (0.196) (0.068) (0.093) (0.196) (0.068) 
(2)-(4): δ2 + δ3 + δ4 
(5)-(7): δ2 + δ3 + δ5 















R-squared  0.165  0.171 0.173 0.175 0.170 0.173 0.171 0.172 
Observations  4270  4270 2222 1886 4270 2222 1886 4270 
Note: ‘HH’ stands for ‘Household’. Adult equivalence scales according to the Oxford scale. All Hausman tests rejected at the 1% level. Omitted category: Settlement village. 





Table A10a: Second job holding responses to wage shocks, full-time vs. part-time sample 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 
Dependent variable  Second job holding 
  Full-time job  Part-time job 
  FE FE FE FE FE  FE  FE  FE 
             
Wage  shock  0.025*      0.052       
  (0.013)      (0.043)       
Intensity of wage shock    0.002        0.011***     
   (0.002)       (0.004)     
Repayment       0.003       -0.437**   
     (0.091)       (0.187)   
Positive wage shock        0.004        -0.121 
      (0.027)        (0.087) 
Log hours main job  -0.022  -0.024  -0.023  -0.024  -0.016  -0.020  -0.027  -0.041 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.041) 
Log non-labor income  0.005**  0.005**  0.005**  0.005**  0.004  0.004  0.007  0.007 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Hourly wage main job  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.002  -0.000  -0.001  -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
             
R-squared  0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.114  0.148  0.130  0.108 
Observations  2974 2974 2974 2974  498  498  498  498 
Note: Part-time is defined as working 35 hours per week or less in 2003. In 2004, individuals can work any number of working hours. This procedure is applied in order to 
keep the panel balanced and to prevent from a mechanical sample selection. This would be the case if, for instance, full-time employees suffer from a wage shock and reduce 
their working hours enough to switch from full-time to part-time employment in 2004. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own 









Table A10b: Subsidiary farming responses to wage shocks, full-time vs. part-time sample 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 
Dependent variable  Subsidiary farming 
  Full-time job  Part-time job 
  FE FE FE FE FE  FE  FE  FE 
             
Wage  shock  0.156**      0.211       
  (0.072)      (0.173)       
Intensity of wage shock    0.013        0.069     
   (0.011)       (0.064)     
Repayment       -0.067       -0.247   
     (0.438)       (0.754)   
Positive wage shock        0.102        0.021 
      (0.133)        (0.389) 
Log hours main job  -0.077  -0.122  -0.098  -0.088  0.065  0.054  0.024  -0.022 
  (0.094) (0.096) (0.094) (0.105) (0.103)  (0.101)  (0.098)  (0.133) 
Log non-labor income  -0.000  -0.003  -0.001  0.005  -0.018  -0.013  -0.007  0.008 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.037) 
Hourly wage main job  -0.014  -0.027  -0.023  -0.031  -0.045*  -0.050*  -0.047*  -0.058* 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
             
R-squared  0.147 0.138 0.135 0.163 0.264  0.260  0.245  0.306 
Observations  718 718 718 718 156  156  156  156 
Note: Part-time is defined as working 35 hours per week or less in 2003. In 2004, individuals can work any number of working hours. This procedure is applied in order to 
keep the panel balanced and to prevent from a mechanical sample selection. This would be the case if, for instance, full-time employees suffer from a wage shock and reduce 
their working hours enough to switch from full-time to part-time employment in 2004. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own 
calculations.  
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Table A11a: Weighting with attrition probability, pooled OLS and Tobit models 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Dependent variable  Second job holding  Hours in second job 
    
 OLS  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
Wage shock  0.023**  0.025**  0.026**  4.566**  4.617***  4.621***
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (1.787)  (1.780)  (1.716) 
Log hours main job  -0.020  -0.021*  -0.022*  -3.621**  -3.556**  -3.247* 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (1.789)  (1.731)  (1.698) 
Log non-labor inc      0.006***      2.397***
     (0.001)      (0.799) 
Hrly wage main job      0.000      -0.109 
     (0.002)      (0.368) 
   0.001*      0.148*  Second job shadow 







Demographic contr.  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Job & wealth contr.  —  —  X  —  —  X 
LL 1663  1559  1574  -574.1  -383.9  -374.1 
(Pseudo)  R-squared  0.014  0.015  0.024 0.035 0.037  0.062 
Observations 3472  3472  3472  3472  3472  3472 
Note: Weights are inverse probability weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 
 
Table A11b: Weighting with attrition probability, pooled OLS and Tobit models 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Dependent variable  Subsidiary farming  Hours in subsidiary farming 
    
 OLS  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
Wage shock  0.009  0.016  0.021  4.661***  4.579***  2.942** 
 (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.047)  (1.161)  (1.359)  (1.315) 
Log hours main job  0.003  -0.009  0.001  -0.200***  -0.191***  -
0.217***
 (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.035)  (0.041)  (0.044) 
Log non-labor inc      -0.005      -0.202 
     (0.009)      (0.253) 
Hrly wage main job      0.005      -0.608 
     (0.010)      (0.407) 
0.009 0.016 0.021  4.661***  4.579***  2.942**  Second job shadow 







Demographic contr.  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Job & wealth contr.  —  —  X  —  —  X 
LL -497.5  -494.4  -482.3  -6287  -3749  -3732 
(Pseudo)  R-squared  0.103  0.098  0.123 0.032 0.029  0.033 
Observations 3472  3472  3472  3472  3472  3472 
Note: Weights are inverse probability weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations. 64 
 
Table A12a: Weighting with attrition probability, panel FE and RE models 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Dependent variable  Second job  Hours in second job 
 
  FE linear  FE linear  RE Tobit  RE Tobit 
Wage shock  0.029**  0.033**  4.845**  4.816** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (1.905)  (2.217) 
Log hours main job  -0.021  -0.020  -3.927**  -3.666* 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (1.823)  (2.134) 
Log non-labor income  0.006***  0.006**  2.452***  2.422*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.680)  (0.836) 
Hourly wage main job  0.002  0.002  -0.068  -0.129 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.377)  (0.466) 
-0.000 -0.000 0.165* 0.178  Second job shadow 
wage (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.086)  (0.111) 
Weights  Unweighted Weighted Unweighted  Weighted 
Demographic controls  X  X  X  X 
Job & wealth controls  X  X  X  X 
Rho 0.530  0.519  0.713  0.684 
LL 3630.9  3541.9  -532.0  -357.9 
R-squared / Chi2  0.016  0.018  35.1  23.3 
Observations 3472  3472  3472  3472 
Note: Weights are inverse probability weights. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations.     
 
Table A12b: Weighting with attrition probability, panel FE and RE models 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Dependent variable  Subsidiary farming  Hours in subsidiary farming 
 
  FE linear  FE linear  RE Tobit  RE Tobit 
Wage shock  0.132**  0.127**  2.293**  3.111** 
 (0.064)  (0.063)  (1.112)  (1.603) 
Log hours main job  0.006  0.000  -0.240***  -0.218*** 
 (0.060)  (0.055)  (0.047)  (0.049) 
Log non-labor income  -0.001  -0.004  -0.043  -0.249 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.246)  (0.316) 
Hourly wage main job  -0.020  -0.016  -0.587  -0.593 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.396)  (0.376) 
Weights  Unweighted Weighted Unweighted  Weighted 
Demographic controls  X  X  X  X 
Job & wealth controls  X  X  X  X 
Rho 0.635  0.632  0.374  0.389 
LL 135.7  139.0  -6224  -3677 
R-squared / Chi2  0.0337  0.0555  312.1  208.3 
Observations 874  874  1834  1834 
Note: Weights are inverse probability weights. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Source: ULMS, own calculations.     65 
Appendix B: Attrition Analysis 
One potential source of bias in the ULMS stems from potential non-random 
panel attrition. Sample attrition of the ULMS amounts to 19.5 percent for the entire 
sample and 18.6 percent among those employed in 2003. For the purpose of this study it 
is, however, interesting to analyze exits more broadly and to consider not only 
individuals who leave the survey but also those who leave the employee status. A more 
general analysis indicates that a substantial fraction of workers leave the employed 
sample in the second year of the panel. As the goal is to track the causal effect from 
labor market shocks on labor supply, it is important to investigate, in which labor 
market states workers moved, and whether they potentially left jobs as a response to 
wage uncertainty. From 2003 to 2004, the raw exit rate from dependent employment is 
at 31 percent of the 2003 sample of dependently employed, while 19 percent newly 
entered into this employment status. The substantial share of exits accounts for persons 
who have reached pension age, engaged in entrepreneurial or professional farming 
business, left their job temporarily in the reference week (e.g. for sickness reasons, 
holidays or maternity leave) or left the labor force voluntarily (all together 9.3 percent) 
or became unemployed (3.1 percent). The remaining 18.6 percent attrited from the 
survey. Table B1 sheds light on the hypotheses that wage arrears might be correlated 
with different kinds of exit behavior from dependent employment. Therefore simple 
binary indicators are constructed which take on the value of one if an employed ULMS 
respondent of 2003 left the sample for any of the given reasons, and zero otherwise. 
These dummies are regressed on a wage shock indicator and some demographic and 
regional characteristics employing a simple linear probability regression framework. If 
attrition was perfectly random, we expect no statistically significant association between 
the propensity to leave the sample and any right-hand side variables. This is rather 
unlikely and indeed, we find that the demographics carry the expected signs. Women 
and older respondents are less likely to leave the survey, while education matters for 
unemployment. The results also suggest some specific geographic patterns of panel 
attrition with inhabitants of the Centre and East region being more reluctant to drop out 
of the panel. Most importantly, however, there is no significant positive or negative 
correlation between the incidence of a wage shock in 2003 and subsequent exit from 
employment or the survey.     
Two approaches are used in order to investigate the impact of sample attrition on 
the estimated second job holding responses: First, beside results stemming from a 66 
balanced panel, the robustness of the results is shown with a maximal data sample 
(Table A4 and Table A5). Second, the main results are re-estimated using inverse 
probability weights (Wooldridge, 2002) that account for the predominant attrition of 
specific subgroups (Table A11 and Table A12).
36 Both procedures have very little 
impact on the estimation results and confirm the robustness of the findings. 
 
Table B1: Determinants of sample attrition, exit from the workforce and 
unemployment 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
(4) 












        
Wage arrear in t 0.006  -0.027  0.008  0.015 
 (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
Age   -0.001  -0.002***  -0.000  0.001** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of education  -0.008**  0.000  -0.003**  -0.003 
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Female   -0.017  -0.038**  0.009  0.022** 
 (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.006)  (0.009) 
Married   0.033*  0.022  0.002  0.001 
 (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.062  0.132  0.049  0.030 
Observations 3097  3097  3097  3097 
Fraction of 2003 sample  28.9%  18.6%  3.1%  7.2% 
Note: The sample consists of all individuals who were eligible for re-interview in 2004. The estimation 
adopts a forward looking linear probability model. Cases (2), (3) and (4) are sub items of (1). All 
regressions control for regions. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 




                                                 
36 Inverse probability weighting proceeds in two steps, where in the first step an attrition indicator for t+1 
is regressed on the covariates at t. In the second step, the fitted attrition probabilities are used as inverse 
weights. 